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 Exotic Readings
 of Cultural Texts'
 by Roger M. Keesing
 Can anthropologists misread cultural texts? Currently fashionable
 relativisms insist that all readings are situated and perspectival.
 Yet our partial command of fieldwork languages and our theoreti-
 cal orientations may lead us to misconstrue other people's talk.
 Our quests for cultural exotica predispose us to read cultural texts
 selectively and to mistake conventional metaphors for metaphys-
 ical accounts. Recent developments in cognitive and linguistic
 theory are examined to show why language creates traps for un-
 wary exotica seekers. There are no magical pathways to "correct"
 interpretation (and no reasons to expect that all of what we once
 deified as "native actors" share the same meanings). Recent ad-
 vances in the study of language, metaphor, and categorization not
 only show why interpretive caution and skepticism are needed
 but provide new ways and means for thinking about and studying
 other culturally constructed and humanly experienced worlds.
 ROGER M. KEESING iS Professor of Anthropology at the Institute
 of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University (GPO
 Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 260i, Australia). Born in I935, he was
 educated at Stanford University (B.A., i956) and at Harvard Uni-
 versity (Ph.D., i965). He taught at the University of California,
 Santa Cruz, from I965 to I974. His research interests are cultural
 theory, cognition, social structure, Marxist theory, language, and
 development. He has published Kwaio Religion: The Living and
 the Dead in a Solomon Island Society (New York: Columbia Uni-
 versity Press, i982); Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary
 Perspective (2d edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
 i98i); with Peter Corris, Lightning Meets the West Wind: The
 Malaita Massacre (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, ig80);
 'Elota's Story (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, i983); a
 Kwaio grammar and dictionary; and some 75 papers in profes-
 sional journals. The present paper was submitted in final form
 5 i 89.
 In these days of fashionable postmodernist relativisms
 in anthropology, the possibility of a definitive interpre-
 tation, a privileged epistemological ground, is vanishing.
 As observers, we are always part of the picture. Interpre-
 tation is always perspectival; realities are always multi-
 ple, and constructed.
 Along with the vanishing goal of a "true" interpreta-
 tion seems to be vanishing, almost unnoticed, the possi-
 bility of a misinterpretation. If we cannot be right, can
 we still be wrong? If we can only interpret, can we still
 misunderstand?
 Anthropologists remain, by and large, committed to
 projects of radical cultural translation, to crossing the
 boundaries of the familiar, to engaging languages and
 cultural traditions that are initially alien and opaque.
 I will argue that the nature of our project, prevailing
 research strategies, theoretical orientations toward
 language and culture, and the reward structures of our
 profession conspire to push us into cultural mis-
 translations.
 I will suggest that some of our ethnographic accounts
 and interpretations are simply wrong, constructed out
 of misunderstandings and mistranslations-failure to
 grasp meanings that are, for native participants in a com-
 munity, the stuff of everyday life and talk. In part, this is
 because we do not-cannot-stay long enough and learn
 local languages well enough. In part, it is because our
 projects-our goals and expectations in representing
 Otherness-push us to overinterpret. Our professional
 role as dealers in exotica (Keesing i987) may impel us to
 seek deep and cosmologically salient meanings where
 native actors may find shallow, conventional and prag-
 matic ones: to discover nonexistent philosophies.
 I will explore as well more subtle processes of selectiv-
 ity and filtering. When we rummage through our field
 notes to find something worth writing about, do we
 select the most exotic materials to characterize and es-
 sentialize Otherness? And if so, do we leave what seems
 mundane-or simply familiar-undescribed?
 The Quest for the Exotic
 An anecdote can serve to illustrate one element in the
 subculture of anthropology that pushes us to choose
 exotic readings of cultural texts. A distinguished an-
 thropologist recently recounted to me how, when some
 years ago he was invited to contribute to a Festschrift for
 Claude Levi-Strauss, he had set out to write a paper ana-
 lyzing the system of direction terminology and spatial
 orientation of the non-Western people with whom he
 had worked. Halfway through, he had decided that the
 orientation system he was describing was fundamen-
 tally the same as our own, and he had never finished the
 paper.
 I, too, have combed the ethnographic and linguistic
 data from the non-Western people I study (the Kwaio of
 Malaita, Solomon Islands) for material exotic enough to
 merit publication. Thus, in preparing a paper arguing
 that semantic analysis of Kwaio required recourse to
 i. I am indebted to Pierre Maranda, James Fernandez, and other
 participants in the symposium "Between Semantics and Rational-
 ity" at the I2th International Congress of Anthropological and Eth-
 nological Sciences in Zagreb (July i988) for helpful comments and
 to Gilles Bibeau and Ellen Corin for inviting me to participate. This
 is a slightly revised version of the paper presented in Zagreb; I am
 grateful to Adam Kuper for suggesting that I might publish the
 paper outside the proposed symposium volume and to Bibeau and
 Corin for giving me permission to do so. The initial conception of
 the paper emerged partly through conversation with C. 0. Frake.
 John Haviland has contributed particularly valuable suggestions for
 revision, and David and Kay French have usefully clarified a long-
 remembered anecdote.
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 cosmological premises and structures (and hence that a
 speaker's linguistic knowledge presupposes cultural
 knowledge [Keesing I9791), I pored over my Kwaio dic-
 tionary (I975) seeking lexical entries that embodied
 takens-for-granted about the world radically different
 from our own. My point, perhaps a worthwhile one, was
 made, but in making it I distorted the general pattern
 of a semantic system constructed, as ours is, mainly
 in terms of pragmatic experience, not cosmological
 schemes.
 Because of the reward structures, criteria of publish-
 ability, and theoretical premises of our discipline, papers
 that might show how un-exotic and un-alien other peo-
 ple's worlds are never get written or read. This filtering
 process is produced by, and sustains, a view of cultural
 relativism and radical diversity that pervades the disci-
 pline. Our predilection for purveying exotica and ignor-
 ing the mundane and unremarkable will be one of my
 concerns. But I have deeper, epistemological doubts. I
 will argue that we are impelled not only to choose the
 most exotic possible cultural data as our texts but to give
 them the most exotic possible readings-and, in doing
 so, often distort and mistranslate.
 Ethnography and Language Learning
 Another factor pushing us into mistranslation is the
 paradox that the search for radically alien cultural mate-
 rial leads us into communities in which local, non-
 European languages-languages that frequently have no
 written grammars or dictionaries or orthographies-are
 spoken. Struggling with local languages as best we can-
 some of us gifted language learners, most of us learning
 slowly and painfully-we usually come to speak them
 with far less than full fluency, certainly with far less
 than a full native command. Those of us who work in
 the field in "exotic" local languages like to imagine that
 despite our limitations in catching all the subtleties
 of conversation, joking, or oratorical allusion, we un-
 derstand the essentials and participate acceptably in
 everyday social life. We may well (as Heine [I9851 points
 out) delude ourselves or overrepresent our linguistic
 command to authenticate our interpretations.
 Achieving even a rough practical working command
 of an alien language within the usual year or year and a
 half of fieldwork is a considerable accomplishment, par-
 ticularly when language learning is ancillary to the tasks
 of ethnography. Where an ethnographer is primarily con-
 cerned with documenting a non-Western people's ag-
 ricultural system or nutrition or articulation into the
 political processes of a postcolonial state, it may suffice
 for this task to work through an interpreter, use a lingua
 franca, or speak a local language with much less than
 full fluency. But increasingly, the fashions of our disci-
 pline push us into characterizing subtle structures of
 cultural symbolism, cosmological systems, or cultural
 constructions of "self" and "person." For such analy-
 ses, I will argue, the confluence of our (theoretically
 motivated) quest for exotica, an inadequate understand-
 ing of the nature of language, and an inadequate com-
 mand of the particular language with which we are
 working may conspire to lead us into error.
 Reverence for Linguistic Evidence
 Any language presents us, in its morphological and syn-
 tactic patterns, with the elements and distinctions
 through which meanings are constructed and communi-
 cated. Reverence for the surface patterning of language
 does not, by itself, take us to the depths of meaning, but
 it is essential to our project of cultural translation that
 we attend to this evidence with the utmost care and
 rigor. My own errors have underlined for me the urgency
 of carefully unpacking all the surface evidence encoded
 in a language as the essential prerequisite for deeper in-
 terpretation. The problems and processes involved can
 be illustrated with reference to ethnographic interpreta-
 tions of mana (and cognate forms) in Oceanic Austrone-
 sian languages (Keesing I984, i985a) of the southwest-
 ern Pacific. My own failures and those of my colleagues
 to attend to the surface linguistic facts closely enough
 not only underline the urgency of meticulous caution
 but illuminate one source of our error: the preconcep-
 tions we bring to the field.
 In the languages of Malaita (Solomon Islands) the
 Oceanic Austronesian word mana2 (in the reduplicated
 forms mamana or the metathesized nanama) is in its
 root form a stative verb, appropriately glossed as "be
 effective, be true, be realized, be successful." Mamana!
 nanama, in addition to being a stative verb, is (with a
 following preposition) in the northern and central
 Malaita languages an active verb, referring to action im-
 puted to or solicited from ancestors: the ancestors
 mamanaInanama-for (support, empower, protect) the
 living (Lau mamana fua-gu 'empower me', Kwaio
 nanama fa-meeru 'support us', both addressed to the an-
 cestors in prayer).3 In Malaita languages, mamanal
 nanama is a noun only when marked morphologically
 by a nominalizing suffix.4 The nominalizing suffix not
 only distinguishes the form as a noun but indicates that
 it is an abstract verbal noun (following the pattern of 'be
 hot' > 'hotness', 'be good' > 'goodness', 'be strong' >
 'strength', which are similarly marked), not a substan-
 tive.
 Ethnographers working on Malaita have, however,
 failed to distinguish between the verbal root form and
 the nominalized form and, partly for this reason, have
 systematically mistranslated mamana/nanama. Having
 2. Proto-Oceanic *manaN.
 3. In Kwaio and the languages of southern Malaita, nanama is also
 used with a transitive suffix to refer to the process whereby the
 ancestral ghosts protect, support, and empower the living (Kwaio
 nanama-nge'eni-gia 'support us', 'Are'are nanama-'ini-nau 'em-
 power me').
 4. A similar marking is used in some Western Solomons languages.
 In Roviana, for example, the marker is an infix (mana 'be effective,
 be potent, be sacred' > m-in-ana 'potency, sanctity'; cf. malahoro
 'be hot' > m-in-alahoro 'heat').
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 discovered these errors by belatedly noticing my own
 repeated mistakes (and having done longer fieldwork
 than the colleagues whose similar errors I will note), I
 point this out simply to illustrate a general problem.
 I have elsewhere (Keesing I985a, n.d.) discussed my
 own error in (prior to I979) translating Kwaio nanama as
 if it were a noun and assigning to it the meaning I had
 learned in an anthropological tradition going back to
 Codrington (i 891): nanama was "power," deriving from
 the spirits. Not until I went back to original taped texts,
 in the course of writing a book on Kwaio religion (Kees-
 ing i982), did I realize that I had been translating verbal
 usages as if they were nouns, qualities and acts as if they
 were an invisible substance.
 When I looked at other Malaita languages, I found that
 in the northern Malaita languages the basic form is the
 reduplicated mamana. Used as a stative verb, mamana
 has been glossed for To'aba'ita (by Waterston I924) "(be)
 true, real, faithful, prosperous, efficacious, proved true,
 fulfilled" and for the closely related Lau dialect (by Fox
 I974) "be efficacious (of medicine), grow well (of trees),
 be good (of news), lucky, in good health; be true, come
 true, be fulfilled." When used as a verbal noun, mamana
 is marked with a nominalizing suffix, either -laa
 (Lau mamana-laa 'good health, good luck, success',
 To'aba'ita mamana-laa 'truth') or, more commonly, -a
 (Lau mamana-a 'spiritual or magical power', To'aba'ita
 mamana-a 'blessing, prosperity').
 Tuming from the missionary dictionaries to ethno-
 graphic accounts, I discovered that from Hogbin's time
 (the I930s) onward, ethnographers of northern Malaita
 had been making translation errors parallel to my own.5
 I shall illustrate only briefly (details are set out in Kees-
 ing n.d.). Ross ( 973: 234-35), for example, observes that
 in Baegu "success, riches, and good health depend on
 ... mamanaa.... As the Baegu use the word it can refer
 to an innate property of holy things, to the blessings
 granted by the gods, or to truth either as an abstract
 quality or in adjectival form.... According to context,
 mamanaa refers to some aspect of the ... constellation
 of meanings 'holy, blessing, good fortune, true, effective,
 power'." Whereas Ross gives the nominalized form and
 assigns both nominal and stative meanings to it, for the
 neighboring Lau dialect Elli Maranda (I976) gives the
 stative form but translates it as a noun: "Mamana
 (mana) has its depository in the altars" (p. i80); "the
 agalo [ancestral spirits] give mamana, the foundation
 and support of life .. . " (p. i96). Elsewhere, Maranda and
 Maranda (I970) write that "the head . . . is the seat of
 mamana" (p. 848) and "[A man] gives [shell] money to
 ... the priest of his lineage to obtain mamana" (p. 856,
 translations mine). 6
 Guidieri (I977) devotes an entire chapter to the con-
 cept of mamanaa among the nearby Fataleka. I will look
 rather more closely at his interpretations of mamanaa
 and related concepts, since they so clearly illustrate the
 problems of cultural translation and language with
 which I am concerned.
 Guidieri's citations and translations of Fataleka texts
 suggest that he had a very limited command of the lan-
 guage and a very partial understanding of Fataleka gram-
 mar. They further suggest that misunderstandings of re-
 corded texts contributed to, and sustained, mystical
 characterizations of the Fataleka world view sharply at
 odds with the interpretations of other ethnographers of
 Malaita. My discussion of these translation problems
 must be bracketed with the proviso that I myself do not
 speak Fataleka and have been able to do only limited
 work with Fataleka informants;7 however, to a student
 of the comparative grammar of Malaita languages, many
 of the mistakes are unmistakable.
 Guidieri's characterization of mamanaa takes the
 word as a noun (even though in Fataleka, as in neigh-
 boring languages/dialects, the stative form is at least
 equally common). Some of the texts he cites contain
 mamana as stative verb, but he mistakes it for the nomi-
 nalized form.8 However, it is with his characterization
 and translation of the nominalized form and his transla-
 tions of texts in which it appears that I am primarily
 concerned. Guideri translates mamana-a as "1'authen-
 tique." "Truth" is indeed one element of the complex
 polysemy of mamana-a (although realisation or verite
 seems a better rendering in French9). But mamana-a in
 Fataleka in other contexts carries meanings that could
 be rendered in English with "potentiation, sacralization,
 effectiveness, blessing, empowerment," and the like;
 moreover, in some contexts of Fataleka sacrifice and
 magic, mamana-a is used as a noun as a kind of euphe-
 mism for the ancestor(s) to whom the invocation is ad-
 dressed.
 Guidieri's mystical characterization of mamana-a as
 "l'authentique" leads him to heights of interpretive im-
 agination in representing its meanings in different con-
 texts and the philosophy supposed to connect them.
 Here, I leave the French untranslated, since it is with
 interpretive language that I am concerned. He depicts
 the Fataleka priest (pp. 9i-92) as
 possede, mais possede par une force de voyance; au-
 trement dit, l'etre hante est un etre "rempli d'authen-
 5. In his earliest account of the mana concept in To'aba'ita, Hogbin
 (I 936:25 9) gives a relatively apt characterization of the surface lin-
 guistic facts: "spirits are possessed of a supernatural power,
 mamanaa .... A successful man is said either to have mamanaa or
 to be mamana, the adjectival, and also the verbal, form of the
 word." In his later writings (e.g., I939), both the grammatical con-
 trast and the adjectival/verbal senses disappear.
 6. "La tete ... est le siege du mamana" and "(Un homme] donne
 l'argent a ... le pretre de sa lign6e, pour obtenir du mamana."
 7. Although I have enlisted the assistance both of Fataleka priests
 and of informants well educated in English who have a strong inter-
 est in their ancestral culture and religion, notably Sam 'Au and
 John Maetia Kaliu'ae.
 8. Thus, he explicates the causative fa'a-mamana-a as "savoir at-
 teindre l'authentique" (p. I35). In Fataleka, as in other Malaita
 languages, the causative prefix converts the stative verbal form
 mamana to a transitive verb, "cause it to be mamana." Fa'a-
 mamana-a can only be "make it true, effective, realized, blessed,"
 etc. Whereas Guidieri assumes the mamanaa following the causa-
 tive to be the nominal form, in fact the -a is a quite different
 grammatical particle, a clitic "it" pronoun suffixed to a transitive
 verb that references its direct object.
 9. Despite Guidieri's etymological rationalization (p. 94 n. I).
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 tique," etre-de-pouvoir dont le role d'authorite coin-
 cide avec le pouvoir que l'Absent, avec violence, lui a
 insuffle.
 Le "pouvoir" est comme le mana: iA bouge, iA
 flotte: aussitot saisi, il disparailt; si on I'a, deja on
 craint sa perte. II ne peut pas pretendre a la perma-
 nence, ni a la transmission. On le subit; on le guette,
 mail comme un feu il ne demeure dans le foyer ou il
 se bruile qu'en tant que presence temporaire.
 The Fataleka world as depicted by Guidieri is populated
 by entities-"'TAbsent" as causal agent, as well as
 "lauthentique"-that, I suggest, exist only in his trans-
 lations, not in Fataleka linguistic usages or thought.
 Soon after (p. 95), we find another: "l'oubli."
 Dans la proposition fataleka, l'oubli n'est pas seule-
 ment l'exteriorisation d'un labeur interieur et puis-
 sant, agi par la force externe, qui s'est introduite dans
 un corps, mais la condition prealable d'un proces dont
 l'aboutissement conduit a l'acquisition d'un pouvoir,
 d'une "voyance." Mamanaa est ce qui se conquiert a
 travers l'oubli et qui permet de "voir" non seulement
 autrement mais mieux vraiment, grace a l'oubli in-
 duit par la deviance.
 Two textual examples will illustrate why I have little
 faith in Guidieri's translations and interpretations. He
 makes much, with regard to mamana-a, of a text he
 records as fa'aburusye: na akaloraoe; mamanaa nya
 sakatafa, which he translates as "(c'est le) produire-
 l'oubli: le travail de l'ancetre; l'authentique est appari-
 tion." According to my Fataleka informants, the sen-
 tence (which should be writtenl' fa'a-buru-sia; na akalo
 rao-a; mamana-a nia sakatafa) means (in this context of
 sacrifice) something like "become possessed (lit., cause-
 [be blurred/confused/forgotten]-ize); the ancestor pro-
 duces it; empowerment becomes manifest." Guidieri's
 rendering of the final clause is crucial (because he makes
 so much of it) and simply wrong. In other contexts,
 sakatafa is "emerge, come into view"; in this context, it
 is (metaphorically) "become manifest." It certainly has
 nothing to do (my informants insist) with the truth's
 being an illusion.
 A second example of mistranslation is more blatant
 (though less crucial to Guidieri's argument). He gives as
 a text na mamana fuu 'e'dao kaa fataa fwana, which he
 renders as "L'authentique parle, et il ecart (il disperse)
 les braises du feu" (The truth speaks, and it scatters the
 embers of the fire). He goes on to explicate the deep
 meaning of the text (again, I leave the French untrans-
 lated, since it is the character of the interpretation that I
 seek to convey): "L'apparition de l'authentique est vue
 (ainsi que l'oubli-apparition-de-la-memoire) comme un
 souffle puissant qui l'abat sur un foyer vivant, s'y creuse
 une place et s'y installe pour, au coeur de cette chaleur
 qu'est la pensee-memoire, agir sur elle." My Fataleka
 informants confirm what my comparative-grammatical
 eye led me to suspect, that the passage has nothing to do
 with embers or fires: na mamana-a fuu e dao, ka fata
 fua-na 'The ancestor comes and talks to him'." What
 faith are we to have in philosophical explorations of the
 mystical depths of the Fataleka mind when they rest on
 linguistic misinterpretations and errors of transcription
 and translation?
 Others have come to grief with mana cognates else-
 where in Melanesia by failing to attend to the surface
 linguistic facts and being deflected by Codringtonian or-
 thodoxies brought with them to the field. Thus, Allen
 (I972) translated the key Nduindui (Ambae, Vanuatu)
 religious concept of manaki as "supernatural power."
 When I pointed out to him that the -ki was almost cer-
 tainly the reflex of the Oceanic transitive suffix and
 therefore mana-ki must be a transitive verb ("mana-
 ize"), he took the opportunity to check, on a subsequent
 field trip. I was right.
 Failure to get linguistic facts right is not a shortcom-
 ing confined to Pacific islands or ethnographers who
 learned what mana meant when they were students.
 Leach (I967), for example, showed symbolic equiva-
 lences between apparently homonymous forms in Jingh-
 paw, forms he thought were phonologically the same
 only because he did not understand the system of tonal
 contrasts in Jinghpaw or the phonemic significance of
 initial and final glottal stops. Differentiated tonally or
 with initial or final consonants, the supposedly homoph-
 onous morphemes are to native speakers as different as
 "far" and "fur" or "cat" and "at" in English (Leach I967,
 Bradley 1977).
 Heine (I985:13), who restudied the Ik made (in)fam-
 ous by Turnbull, further illustrates the pervasiveness of
 the problem of mistranslation with reference to Turn-
 bull's analyses of Ik religious beliefs:
 We are told [by Turnbull] ... that there is gor, the
 soul, which "flies past the moon that is good and the
 sun that is bad, and on to the stars, where the abang
 have their eternal existence" (Turnbull I974:I6I). We
 are further informed that "A soul is round and red,
 but it has no arms or legs. It rests somewhere in the
 vicinity of the stomach . . ." (Turnbull I974: i6i. This
 is hardly surprising, since gor (more precisely gur) is
 the Ik word for heart, which is occasionally used to.
 mean "spirit," "soul." That gor is able to fly to the
 stars where the abang live is, however, a strange idea
 to the Ik. The word aban means "my father" and in
 no way refers to "ancestors" or "ancestral spirits," as
 Turnbull (I 974: I 5 3, I 67) claims.
 Yet even if we attend to the surface linguistic evidence
 carefully, it does not guarantee us easy access to la pen-
 see sauvage.
 io. Here I hyphenate morpheme boundaries for analytical pur-
 poses.
 i i. In this context of sacrifice, mamana-a is used as a euphemism
 for the ancestor to whom an invocation is being made. Guidieri
 was apparently confused by the similarity between fua-na "for-
 him" (here, "to him") and fua-na ere (or, for some Fataleka-
 speakers, fue-na ere), "embers of the fire."
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 Metaphors, Prototypes, and Interpretation
 Recent developments in the understanding of language
 and cognition give further reason for concern in the en-
 counter of an ethnographer with another people's world.
 It is worth pausing to consider a question long insuf-
 ficiently examined in both cognitive and symbolic an-
 thropology and now squarely raised in postmodernist
 thought as it has filtered through to our discipline:
 whether "native" participants in a culture have priv-
 ileged access to meaning. If we ask whether ethnog-
 raphers can mistranslate and misinterpret, are we as-
 suming that there is some "insider" sharing of meanings
 by native participants from which we are excluded? Are
 there "correct" translations and interpretations that na-
 tive speakers of languages in effect imbibe with breast
 milk?
 I make no such assumptions. I have long argued that
 the assumed sharing of meaning and the imputed omni-
 science of the "native speaker" are heuristic myths of
 our own making that have retarded critical thinking
 about the dynamics and politics of cultural knowledge.
 It is partly for this reason that I have focused here at the
 outset on relationships that are overtly marked on the
 surface of language: for native speakers of a language do
 share a code, at this level, that we may only partially
 understand. I believe that the stuff of daily life and
 talk-which is all most native participants in most com-
 munities in human history have had access to -is
 deeply and multiply ambiguous, allowing of alternative,
 perspectival interpretations. The native participant, like
 the ethnographer, is situated, part of the picture; the
 native participant, like the ethnographer, seeks to con-
 struct generalizations from particularities and frag-
 ments, to recover "rules" from patterns. Using data from
 my own Kwaio fieldwork (I987), I have illustrated how
 interpretation by native participants varies in depth and
 coherence-how meanings are evoked by, not em-
 bodied in, cultural symbols and how what we interpret,
 in our own worlds, depends on what we know. Where,
 then, lies the epistemological advantage of the native
 participant in contrast to the ethnographer who-I sug-
 gest-can still misinterpret and mistranslate? It might
 be too irreverent to suggest that-in addition to longer
 and deeper immersion in a language and the life of a
 community-the native participant has not studied an-
 thropology. But I will at least suggest that our theories
 mislead us with regard to the nature of language and
 meaning.
 The recent outpouring of work on metaphor in critical
 theory, linguistics, cognitive science, and other fields
 has made it clear that metaphors are not a surface em-
 broidery on literal, propositional languages; rather, all
 languages are pervaded by-indeed constructed out of
 -metaphor. Deconstructing the opposition between
 metaphor and literal language in the style of Derrida,
 Culler (i982:I48) suggests that "the literal is the oppo-
 site of the figurative, but a literal expression is also a
 metaphor whose figurality has been forgotten."
 As Lakoff and Johnson (I980; Lakoff I987) argue, most
 metaphors are not creative extrapolations from literal
 use. Rather, they are conventional, built into the seman-
 tics and even the structure of language. A schema of
 conventional metaphor establishes a similarity in pat-
 tem between a source domain and a domain likened to
 it. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the experiential bases
 of metaphor as crucial both in the images drawn of the
 source domain and in the equivalences drawn between it
 and another.
 Systems of conventional metaphor use body parts or
 spatial imagery or physical acts or states to represent
 other domains-temporal relationships, social relation-
 ships, inner states (such as emotions). The life cycle-
 birth, procreation, death-may be used to characterize
 social events and processes or cosmic processes. POWER
 IS HEAT, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, LIFE IS A JOURNEY,
 INNER STATES ARE COLORS, THE BODY IS A CON-
 TAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS, PARTS OF SOCIETY
 ARE PARTS OF THE BODY-such conventional meta-
 phoric connections between domains structure talk in
 every language. They doubtless structure thought as
 well in important ways but ways that we are, I think,
 prone to overestimate.
 It is not, as Lakoff and Johnson seem at times to imply,
 that other peoples' world views are constructed out of
 their metaphoric systems. Rather, as Quinn (I987) use-
 fully insists, the metaphoric systems of particular peo-
 ples are expressions of their culturally constructed
 worlds as well as the reverse. Quinn argues that different
 metaphoric schemes in a particular language may them-
 selves be connected in systematic ways reflective
 of cultural-conceptual systems that underlie them.
 Metaphors, that is, are constructed in terms of, as well as
 themselves being constitutive of, a people's view of the
 world. But that does not mean that we can easily infer
 from the metaphoric usages the systems of cultural
 assumption-if any-that underlie them. Nor does it
 mean that all native actors necessarily share assump-
 tions about how the world works, despite being able to
 use the linguistic coin of the community. I have dis-
 cussed (Keesing I985a) the way English speakers talk
 about "luck" in conventional metaphors, as though
 "luck" were a substance people had more or less of and
 as though "Luck" were a person determining the out-
 come of what appear to be games of chance. These
 conventional ways-of-talk imply, however, no cor-
 responding beliefs about the world, and individual
 speakers of the language apparently hold widely varying
 folk models of cause and chance. We have no reason to
 assume either that other peoples' schemes of conven-
 tional metaphor are more deeply expressive of cosmolog-
 ical schemes than our own or that their "cultural mod-
 els" are more uniform than ours.
 The connections between universes proposed in con-
 ventional metaphor thus create potential traps for the
 unwary ethnographer seeking cosmological structures
 and deep symbolic meanings. Conventional metaphors
 may suggest metaphysical relationships or cosmological
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 structures that in fact have no salience for native speak-
 ers.'2 As ethnographers, we may infer that for the people
 we are studying, the belly, or the liver, is "the seat of the
 emotions" when (as I have suggested [Keesing I 985a]) no
 more need be implied than we imply in our talk of
 "hearts." The danger of our constructing nonexistent
 metaphysical schemes that seem to be implied by con-
 ventional metaphors but would be meaningless or ab-
 surd to native speakers if they could read what we write
 about them raises ethnographic nightmares for me.
 The metaphoric structuring of language operates at
 deeper levels as well, and here too it may mislead us.
 Recent work on categorization (discussed by Lakoff
 i987) shows how central metaphor and metonymy are in
 connecting the multiple senses of words. The Aristote-
 lian assumptions on which 2,ooo years of Western logic
 and philosophy have built-most centrally, the assump-
 tion that categories are defined with regard to common
 features-are turning out to misrepresent radically the
 cognitive bases of categorization, and hence of thought.
 Metaphor is crucial in the internal structure and articu-
 lation of categories.
 Lakoff shows how, in what he calls "radial" seman-
 tic structures, several base models converge on a pro-
 totypic exemplar. Noncentral members of the category
 may each bear some resemblance to central or proto-
 typic members, on the basis of metaphoric and met-
 onymic connection; yet they need have no connection to
 one another. Lakoff illustrates with "mother" in En-
 glish, which is structured according to base models of
 genetic connection, of nurturance, of giving birth, etc.
 Den mothers need have nothing directly in common
 with unwed or unfit or working mothers or with neces-
 sity, the mother of invention. The multiple senses may
 be played off against one another, as in "My real mother
 wasn't a real mother to me," readily understandable by
 any native English-speaker. Wittgenstein first pointed
 out in his late writings on "family resemblances" that
 members of a category need have no common feature.
 But whereas Wittgenstein suggested a kind of fan struc-
 ture of partly overlapping meanings, with one end of the
 fan possibly quite different from the other, the recent
 work on natural categorization goes further, and in a
 different direction. Multiple base models converge on or
 overlap in the case of prototypic examplars. Other mem-
 bers of the category are connected to prototypic mem-
 bers through metaphoric or metonymic connection to
 one or more of the component base models; all have
 some systematic resemblance to the prototype but in
 quite different ways.
 One important mechanism here is what Lakoff (i987)
 calls "image-schema transformations." 3 An abstract
 image-of, say, a trajectory along a path or an aperture-
 may be central to the meaning of a category, but the
 connections between senses of the category depend on
 transformations such that the end-point of the path is
 equated with the path ("He walked over the hill" > "He
 lives over the hill") or what fits into the aperture is
 equated with the aperture ("They cut a window in their
 dining room" > "The new window for their dining room
 was delivered"). The way in which image-schema trans-
 formations and metaphoric extensions from them struc-
 ture extremely complex categories has so far mainly
 been explored with reference to English prepositions.
 Summarizing Brugman's (i98i) work on the semantics
 of "over" in English, which shows how almost iOO
 senses of "over" are connected by images that are trans-
 forms of one another, Lakoff suggests that "there are
 certain very natural relationships among image-
 schemas, and these motivate polysemy, not just in one
 or two cases, but in case after case throughout the lexi-
 con" (P. 440). Spatial image schemas, connected to one
 another through transformations, are extended meta-
 phorically to nonphysical acts and states ("think it
 over," "do it over," "look it over," "overstate," "over-
 look," "overthrow").
 The images on which categorization builds are expe-
 rience-rich, grounded in visual and kinaesthetic experi-
 ence (Johnson I987, Lakoff and Johnson I980); hence,
 they seem to vary less than our culturalist dogmas pre-
 dispose us to expect. Universal patterns in the logics of
 categorization, the way image-schema transformations
 and chains of metaphoric connection operate, seemingly
 underlie the particularities of cultural meaning that in-
 fuse different languages. As Johnson (I987) suggests,
 these patterns are in a deep and natural way embedded in
 the experience of creatures with bodies like ours (and
 brains like ours) on the surface of a planet like ours. This
 is not to deny cultural diversity but to situate it theoreti-
 cally. Casad (i982) shows for Cora (a Uto-Aztecan lan-
 guage) how non-Western cultures have their own rich
 systems of image schemas and metaphor. "The image-
 schematic structure of Cora is strikingly different from
 that of English, though . . . many of the elements and
 principles of image composition are similar" (Lakoff
 I987:460).
 Metaphor pervades grammatical systems as well.
 Thus, for example, grammatical relationships such as
 causation and transitivity build upon prototypic images
 of physical agency, of acts that physically manipulate or
 transform objects in the world. Yet in grammatical sys-
 tems, relationships, events, and processes are concep-
 tualized metaphorically as being similar to prototypic
 scenarios (Lakoff and Johnson I980:69-76; Lakoff
 I987:54-55). "The prototypical core of the concept
 CAUSATION, namely DIRECT MANIPULATION, is
 ... a gestalt consisting of properties that naturally occur
 together in our daily experience of performing direct ma-
 I 2. Indeed, the recent work on conventional metaphor makes clear
 that it will be by no means easy to distinguish metaphoric from
 nonmetaphoric talk. We cannot even assume that the boundaries
 between proper and common nouns will be transparent across cul-
 tural boundaries. I am reminded of David French's story of his
 Oregon Indian informants' becoming agitated each time he drove
 them past a particular precipitous spot. When he queried them,
 they explained that, as the sign warned them to do, they were
 watching out for Rolling Rock.
 I3. In this, Lakoff builds in particular on the work of Talmy (I 975,
 I978, I98I).
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 nipulations [and] is basic and primitive in our experi-
 ence.... [This] prototypical core of CAUSATION is
 elaborated metaphorically in various ways" (Lakoff and
 Johnson I98o:75-76). Whatever grammatical mecha-
 nisms develop in a language to express causatives or
 to mark transitivity may-through such logics of
 metaphor-be used to express relationships not based on
 "cause" or agency. This creates further traps for the an-
 thropologist zealously seeking to interpret another cul-
 ture through ways of talk. When we find, in another
 people's language of which we have acquired a partial
 command, that events and connections between them
 are characterized as if they were based on physical ma-
 nipulation by a human agent, are we in danger, if we
 seek to characterize their concept of causality, of invent-
 ing nonexistent philosophies?
 Heine and his colleagues (Heine and Reh I984, Claudi
 and Heine I986, Heine, Claudi, and Hunnemayer n.d.)
 have explored how grammatical patterns are structured
 by "categorial metaphors." Categorial metaphors draw
 on experientially salient connections between domains
 in a systematic way that seems to hold across languages.
 That is, domains have a "natural" relationship of expe-
 riential primacy or immediacy relative to one another,
 such that less immediate or more abstract domains are
 characterized in terms of more experience-rich or di-
 rectly accessible or concrete ones. Heine and his col-
 leagues characterize these domains in a chain: PERSON
 > OBJECT > SPACE > TIME > PROCESS > QUAL-
 ITY. A particular domain in the chain may serve to char-
 acterize all those written to the right of it. Put another
 way, a domain may be likened metaphorically to any
 of the domains to its left in the chain. The metaphoric
 relationships proposed have been explored in some de-
 tail for the Niger-Congo language Ewe by Claudi and
 Heine (I986). They examine how a series of conven-
 tional metaphoric equivalences-AN OBJECT IS A
 PERSON, SPACE IS AN OBJECT, A QUALITY IS AN
 OBJECT, QUALITY IS SPACE, TIME IS SPACE, A
 PROCESS IS SPACE, QUALITY IS A PROCESS-are
 reflected in Ewe grammar.
 The operation of metaphor and image-schema trans-
 formation in language is being studied not only syn-
 chronically but diachronically. In a burgeoning concern
 with what is being called "grammaticalization," lin-
 guists (including Heine and his colleagues) are examin-
 ing how lexical forms progressively become transformed
 into grammatical elements.'4 The lexical forms become,
 in the (metaphorical) parlance of grammaticalization
 theorists, "bleached" of their semantic content and
 come to serve abstract relational functions (although in
 other contexts they may retain their lexical force).
 Heine and his collaborators have explored in detail
 how grammaticalization has operated in Niger-Congo
 languages. Thus, for example, they discuss how a verb of
 volition applied to a "willful human agent" comes, fol-
 lowing the metaphoric equivalence of PERSON > OB-
 JECT, to be used to mark grammatical relationships
 involving "a non-human entity incapable of willful ac-
 tions." As metaphoric relationships lead to gram-
 maticalizations along what Heine and his colleagues call
 "grammaticalization chains," the original lexical usages
 may remain, along with new ones. They illustrate with
 the Ewe lexeme megbe 'back', which "stands for at least
 seven differing conceptual entities constituting a chain
 of increasing 'abstractness' extending from a concrete,
 visible/tangible entity, a body part . . . to a gram-
 maticalized word which has turned from a nominal into
 an adverbial entity" (Heine, Claudi, and Hunnemayer
 n.d.) Grammaticalization chains lead to the use of body
 parts as directionals (e.g., "back" and "front" in English),
 then markers of temporal relationships. Verbs for
 "come"/ or "go" become auxiliaries, then aspect mark-
 ers, then tense markers. Possessives are formed out of
 expressions of spatial proximity or (as in many African
 languages) body-part terms (particularly "hand"). Second
 verbs in serial verb constructions become detached as
 postpositions and acquire new grammatical functions
 as complementizers.
 Claudi and Heine (i986:320-2 I) point out that in Ewe
 "the conceptualization of actions/processes in terms of
 spatial orientation has become idiomatic, and it has
 been grammaticalized to the extent that modern speak-
 ers of Ewe are unaware of the metaphorical, and ety-
 mological, base of the progressive and ingressive aspects:
 the morphemes le 'be at', m 'in', be 'at' have entirely lost
 their locative significance [and are] frozen relics of what
 once constitute[d] lively metaphors."
 All of these processes leave in a language trails of
 metaphoric connection, webs of loosely overlapping
 meanings. The connections between forms may, de-
 pending on how far the grammaticalization process has
 proceeded, remain visible to native speakers or be ob-
 scured from their view by convention and phonological
 shift.
 Anthropological Interpretation
 The residues of a language's history leave sticky traps for
 the unwary anthropologist seeking in linguistic usages
 evidence of radically different Otherness. Into a commu-
 nity in which the medium of daily talk is a language
 pervaded by conventionally metaphoric idioms (English
 "He broke her heart," "Some people have all the luck,"
 "It was the hand of fate"), with a semantic system con-
 structed out of metaphoric and metonymic chains of
 connection (reflect on the intricately interconnected
 senses of "back" in English) and a grammar that repre-
 sents a complex history of metaphor-based grammati-
 calization chains, comes an ethnographer implicitly or
 explicitly in search of exotic cultural texts. Staying long
 I4. I am indebted to Talmy Giv6n for inviting me to participate in a
 symposium on grammaticalization at the University of Oregon in
 May I988 and to him and colleagues in the symposium, particu-
 larly Eugene Casad, Zygmunt Frajzyngier, Joseph Greenberg, Bernd
 Heine, Charles Li, Frank Lichtenberk, James Matisoff, Ger
 Reesink, Gillian Sankoff, and Elizabeth Traugott, for helpful dis-
 cussion.
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 enough to get a practical command of everyday conver-
 sational usage but far less than the five or ten years it
 would take to command the nuances of meaning, the
 ethnographer tries to characterize another people's cul-
 turally constructed world.
 Even if we came trying to find another people's
 metaphors-rather than their cosmological premises,
 conceptions of time and space, or concept of person-we
 would be prone to misconstrue their talk. Lakoff and
 Johnson (i980:I43) report that
 an Iranian student, shortly after his arrival in Berke-
 ley, . . . found ... an expression that he heard over
 and over and understood as a beautifully sane
 metaphor ... : "the solution of my problems"
 -which he took to be a large volume of liquid,
 bubbling and smoking, containing all of your prob-
 lems.... He was terribly disillusioned to find that
 the residents of Berkeley had no such chemical
 metaphor in mind.
 Fortunately, the Iranian was a linguistics student taking
 a course on metaphor from Lakoff and not an anthro-
 pologist intent on describing American cosmology or
 conception of self.
 I will illustrate the traps a language leaves for the un-
 wary exotica-seeker with examples from Kwaio-a lan-
 guage I have learned in almost five years of fieldwork
 and of which I have published a dictionary (Keesing
 I975) and a grammar (Keesing I985b). I have stumbled
 into some of these traps despite my fluency in the lan-
 guage and have avoided others.
 THE PATH OF THE SELF
 The ethnographer seeking evidence of the distinctive
 cultural construction of "self" or "person" could take as
 one important piece of evidence the way Kwaio talk of
 "selves."
 We begin with the root form tala 'path.' 15 With a di-
 rectly suffixed possessive pronoun, tala-gu is 'my track'
 (i.e., the imprint I make on the ground).'6 As in many
 languages, 'path' has various metaphor-based meanings
 in Kwaio. Thus, suga tala-na 'pay the way for [lit. "buy
 the path of"] a child by contributing bridewealth for the
 parental marriage'; taunga'i tala-na 'bring to maturity
 by working on his/her behalf' (lit. "work the path for"),
 'bring an event to fruition through one's work'; beri tala-
 na mae-na 'bring death to through one's stealing' (lit.
 "steal the path of his death"). Through the common con-
 ventional metaphoric schema A LIFE IS A JOURNEY
 ALONG A PATH, further connections are opened up, as
 in tala'osi'a 'grow to maturity without being seriously
 ill, disfigured by injury, etc.' (lit. "uninterrupted path").
 By further extension from the domain of persons to the
 domain of inanimate objects, "path" is used to express
 separation and contrast: ngai i tala-na 'it's separate, it's
 different' (lit. "it's on its own path").
 This then leads to a linguistic pattern for talking about
 the reflexivity of action: ta-ku age-a i tala-gu 'I'll do it
 myself' (lit. "do it along my [own] path"). This construc-
 tional pattern, using tala- as an inalienably possessed
 noun and following a locative particle, parallels con-
 structions in Kwaio using directionals derived from body
 parts such as i buri-gu 'behind me' (lit. "at my back")
 and i na'o-gu 'in front of me' (lit. "at my front"). Kwaio
 goes a further step toward grammaticalization in using
 tala- with the possessive pronominal suffix but without
 the preceding locative particle, either following a verb or
 as object of a preposition. Again, the metaphoric basis
 for this usage is "on one's own path": 'agolo leka tala-
 dauru 'Let's go ourselves' 17 (lit. "go along our [own]
 path"); Fa'afeloa ka lolofe'enia mola mae fana tala-na
 'Fa'afeloa connected the killing to himself', i.e., impli-
 cated himself, in this case falsely (lit. "for-it his-path";
 cf. English "he brought it on himself").'8 What might
 an ethnographer seeking a distinctive culturally con-
 structed Kwaio concept of "self" or "person" create out
 of this partial grammaticalization of a conventional
 metaphor?
 If the ethnographer were working in the neighboring
 Kwara'ae language, in which the metaphor-based gram-
 maticalization of tala- as "self" has gone rather further,
 the possibilities of ethnographic imagination would be
 given freer rein: ngai fa'a-ta'ini-a tala-na 'He showed
 himself' (lit. "he cause-be shown his-path"). (In Kwaio
 rngai e faa-te'eni-a i tala-na would be "He showed it by
 himself.") Here, tala-na is used to label a "self" that is
 the direct object of a verb, hence a further step toward a
 kind of substantivization of the "self." A second ex-
 ample (like the first one, from an old missionary gram-
 mar [Deck I934:5 ii) exemplifies how in Kwara'ae tala-
 n2a can be used (as in the third Kwaio example) as the Dbject of a preposition. More significant, it illustrates a
 second grammatical device for indicating reflexivity,
 :ne which shows tala further along the way to gram-
 maticalization: wae ke tala lafu-ni-a 'a-na tala-na 'Man
 =xalts himself' (lit. "man REFLEXIVE exalt to-him his-
 path"). Either device can be used in Kwara'ae to indicate
 reflexivity upon a "self," or both can be used together, as in this example. An ethnographer seeking to charac-
 terize the Kwara'ae conception of "self" would be likely
 to pick up "his path" as evidence, since the possessive
 particle clearly indicates its lexical source, but the re-
 lexive-marking tala as a preverbal grammatical element LS a further step along the path of grammaticalization, IS. The reflex of an old Austronesian form, reconstructed as some approximation to *jalan 'road, path' in Proto-Austronesian.
 I6. In Oceanic languages, a distinction is made between grammat-
 ically inalienable possession (canonically for parts of a body or
 plant), in which a pronominal suffix is attached directly to the
 noun, and grammatically alienable possession, with the pronomi-
 nal suffix attached to a particle, characteristically a locative. In
 many Oceanic languages further distinctions of semialienability
 (e.g., edibles, drinkables) are drawn.
 I7. The dual inclusive pronoun golo indicates that reference is to
 "you and I."
 I8. This is a fragment from a recently recorded text regarding a.
 resurgence of blood feuding and bounty hunting among Kwaio tra-
 ditionalists.
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 having lost its pronominal possessive suffix and moved
 into the verb phrase. We might expect that, eventually,
 the fully grammaticalized preverbal marking of reflexiv-
 ity with tala (in the Kwara'ae of the 22d century?) would
 replace the postverbal construction using the inalien-
 ably possessed noun tala. That is, the construction "on
 my path" to express reflexivity is a partial grammatical-
 ization seemingly'9 based on an extension of the A LIFE
 IS A JOURNEY ALONG A PATH metaphoric scheme
 (just as the Kwaio directionals are partial grammaticali-
 zations based on the metaphoric equivalence of spatial
 orientations to body parts discussed at length for African
 languages by Heine and his colleagues). When a form
 moves further down the chain in the grammaticalization
 process, the historical metaphoric connection of gram-
 matical element to lexical form (as with Kwara'ae tala as
 a preverbal marker of reflexivity) disappears.
 We may well wonder what an ethnographer com-
 mitted to the now-familiar task of showing a distinctive
 cultural construction of personhood/selfhood on some-
 Pacific-island-or-another (White and Kirkpatrick i985)
 would do with the Kwaio (or Kwara'ae) self, conceptu-
 alized as a path through life. I am deeply skeptical of
 interpretations for which the main evidence lies in the
 stuff of language.20
 A MANTLE OF PROTECTION
 In a paper in which I sought to show how languages are
 infused with cultural meanings, one of my examples was
 what I called a " 'mantle' conceptualization of mana"
 (Keesing I979:24): "The closest that Kwaio get to talk-
 ing about mana in even quasi-physical terms is to treat
 mana by indirection as if it were a kind of mantle with
 which the ancestors envelop the living, their settle-
 ments, their gardens, protecting them from malevolent
 and dangerous uncontrolled powers of the world of na-
 ture." I have noted how I had been ignoring crucial sur-
 face-linguistic evidence in treating nanama, the Kwaio
 equivalent of mana, as if it were a substantive. Here, I
 will examine a usage I offered in the I979 paper as
 exemplification of the "mantle" conceptualization:
 The quasi-verbal form 'afuia 'around, around the out-
 side of' . . . occurs in constructions such as "pass
 around the outside of," or "stand on each side of me."
 Aga 'afuinau is "look after me, take responsibility for
 me.". . . Consider now several usages where the
 agent is a human actor but where the mantle of 'afuia
 is the ancestral mantle of protection:
 nalu 'afuia 'sacrifice in expiation of' (lit. "wash
 around the outside of," but here, "purify to restore
 the ancestral mantle around")
 lii 'a/uia 'consecrate a propitiatory pig to an ances-
 tor to maintain the mantle around'
 gama 'afuia kalonga 'ritually eat a sacred taro pud-
 ding to ensure ancestral benefits for the land'.
 ... The transparency of such forms to Kwaio-speak-
 ers is at least partly clear once the cultural idiom of
 mana as a protective mantle against malevolent and
 destructive forces has been explicated.
 Although the general thrust of my argument about
 languages' being infused with cultural meanings proba-
 bly remains reasonable, reading cultural meanings from
 or into linguistic forms is a more hazardous enterprise
 than I had realized a decade ago. Both on historical/
 comparative and on theoretical grounds, it seems that
 use of 'afuia in these last, nonphysical senses represents
 the processes of metaphor and language change I have
 sketched. The root form 'afu is a stative verb, "be
 wrapped." By metaphoric semantic extension, being
 wrapped up serves to express completeness: akwalee
 'ola e 'afu 'fully ten things' (lit. "ten things it be wrapped
 up"); lamo'afu 'an all-purpose warrior' (i.e., one who
 manifests all the usually separate components of war-
 riorhood); 'a/u-ta-na ta'a 'all the people'. In contempo-
 rary Kwaio, 'afu-i-a is not used as a transitive verb. To
 form a transitive verb using 'afu, Kwaio uses the causa-
 tive prefix faa-'afu-a 'cause it to be wrapped up'.2' The
 form I offered in support of the supposed "mantle" con-
 ception of mana, 'afu-i-a, falls into a small class of
 Kwaio prepositions which follow the morphological pat-
 tern of transitive verbs. The semantic bases of the prepo-
 sitional verbs, in relation to the roots from which they
 are derived,22 are characteristically metaphoric, as in
 fono-si-a 'against' (from fono 'be blocked'). 'Afu-i-a ap-
 parently has a similar metaphoric connection to 'a/u. In
 its most common manifestations, 'a/u-i-a refers to a spa-
 tial relationship, "around, around the outside of" (by
 analogy to a wrapping around the outside of something).
 By a further metaphoric semantic extension from this
 sense of "around," 'afu-i-a has come in some contexts to
 mean "on behalf of." This is the sense expressed in naru
 'afuia 'sacrifice in expiation of' and gama 'afuia kalonga
 'ritually eat a sacred taro pudding to ensure ancestral
 benefits for the land'. I see no grounds, now, for assum-
 ing that such constructions entail any metaphysical
 implications regarding a "mantle" preserved by the an-
 cestors. They simply represent the processes of concep-
 tualization and linguistic change, metaphorically based,
 that I have characterized. If we want to be able to say
 with confidence that Kwaio conceptualize a mantle of
 protection maintained by the ancestors, we have to find
 evidence for such an interpretation outside the realm of
 linguistic forms: in what they say and do, not in the
 ig. John Haviland suggests the possibility of an alternative inter-
 pretation, in terms of a metaphoric schema MY PATH IS MY
 FACE/BODY.
 20. I am, however, quite prepared to be convinced when the linguis-
 tically based inferences are strongly supported by folk exegeses or
 other evidence of corresponding "beliefs."
 2i. The transitive verb forms 'a/u-a 'wrap up' and 'a/u-te'e-ni-a
 'complete, finish off, wrap up' have been recorded but are not in
 common use.
 22. Where these roots are still used as free forms. Some, such as
 fe'e-ni-a 'with' and fa'a-si-a 'away from', presumably derive from
 old roots, probably stative verbs, but these have disappeared.
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 resources their language provides for expressing conven-
 tionalized meanings. Attending to our linguistic usages,
 I have suggested (Keesing i985a), an ethnographer from
 another cultural world could-following the procedures
 I used a decade ago to interpret 'afuia-depict our world
 as a cosmic struggle between good luck and bad luck.
 WHERE THE FUTURE LIES
 In my quest for evidence of how Kwaio cosmology was
 embodied in language (Keesing I979), I suggested that
 the use of directionals with reference to time was
 "motivated ... by a cultural conception of time: ... the
 Kwaio . -. . conception that views the past as having
 moved forward and downward from the point of refer-
 ence of the speaker" (p. 31). I used as evidence Kwaio
 expressions that use the directionals "down" and "up"
 with the lexeme for year: farisi lofo'u 'last year' (lit.
 "year down there"); farisi lolo'o 'next year' (lit. "year up
 there"); farisi lolo'o mai 'next year' (lit. "year coming
 down from up there"). I noted (Keesing I979:3I) that
 The conceptualization of time in Kwaio culture is a
 permutation of a very widespread (conceivably uni-
 versal) conception of human life as a line of march.
 The two critical cycles that probably always serve as
 paradigms of time are the seasonal cycle (homologous
 in this respect to the lunar cycle) and the human life
 cycle and passing of generations. These symbolic con-
 ceptions, plus the biologically structured appercep-
 tion of temporality and experiences of memory, are
 woven into culturally patterned designs that are
 much less diverse than they might be. In culture after
 culture, one's predecessors are viewed as having gone
 ahead along a line of march you are following, and
 one's own life experiences are seen as having been
 "left behind."
 This, I think, is apt enough. But I do not now believe the
 evidence of language gives adequate grounds for my hav-
 ing inferred that
 Kwaio culture permutes this model by conceptualiz-
 ing the time periods associated with those who have
 gone before ... as being in front of and downward
 from the present. The past in general is alata i na'o
 'time in front'; last year can be referred to as farisi ka
 riu kau ('year has passed by away-from-the-speaker');
 and, as evidenced by linguistic usages and ritual pro-
 cedures, it is conceived as having moved downward.
 In view of recent studies of the metaphoric bases
 whereby body parts come to serve as directionals and
 directionals come metaphorically to reference relation-
 ships in time, I do not believe we can justifiably make
 inferences about cosmology on the basis of spatial deixis
 in time expressions. (Nor, in view of the way lexical
 verbs [and other forms] develop into markers of aspect
 and of tense, can we uncritically make such inferences
 on the basis of lexical sources of grammatical markers of
 the time-frames of events.)
 If indeed there is evidence in "ritual procedures" or
 other nonlinguistic realms of the dramatization or
 enactment of a culturally constructed view of time, an
 ethnographer can appropriately use such evidence (with
 caution) to make and justify claims about a people's
 world view. (I find myself skeptical, in retrospect, about
 my own claims that in the Kwaio case "ritual proce-
 dures" provide such evidence.) Linguistic patterns of the
 sort I have illustrated constitute very thin evidence of
 cosmology, although I have no doubt that the systematic
 exploration of other people's conventional metaphoric
 schemas would be culturally revealing in less sweeping
 ways (see Keesing I985a, Casad i982, Salmond i983).
 The Iranian in Berkeley can well serve as a reminder of
 our fallibility in this project, as in others.
 Metaphor, Semantics, and
 Symbolic Interpretation
 The implications for interpretive anthropology that I
 draw from the new developments in semantics and syn-
 tax are by no means uniformly negative. I have recently
 argued (in Keesing i988) that analyzing and interpreting
 the rich metaphoric and metonymic structures of cate-
 gorization in non-Western languages is a major task. In-
 deed, I suggest that the developments in the semantics
 of natural categorization have given it new urgency. I
 argue that the metaphoric connections whereby seman-
 tic categories are extended and articulated may be di-
 rectly related to patterns of ritual symbolism and myth,
 making analysis of ethnographic semantics and symbol-
 ist interpretation complementary tasks. A case in point
 is the Kwaio concept of mamu. Mamu is the invisible
 but irresistible attractive power of scent: mamu is the
 scent of flowers, and it labels as well the bait thrown
 into the sea to attract fish. But mamu is also the major
 complex of magic, involving elaborate ritual sequences,
 whereby valuables are attracted to a mortuary feast
 (Keesing i982). The ritual dramas enacted and the magic
 performed for mamu build heavily on exactly the same
 metaphoric equivalences that structure the semantic
 category: powerfully aromatic leaves are used in magic,
 chewed and spat on chests and puddings, and thrown
 into the sea to attract valuables.
 The new developments in understanding language and
 categorization open exciting vistas for anthropology: In
 bringing together our skills in cultural interpretation-
 and there is much in our practice to commend and ad-
 mire despite the negative role as devil's advocate I have
 assumed here-with the new insights into grammati-
 calization, conventional metaphor, and natural categori-
 zation, a more balanced and positive view of how experi-
 enced and conceptualized culturally constructed worlds
 are at once unique and recognizably human can emerge.
 Conclusions
 It has fallen to anthropology, in the division of labor of
 the disciplines of 20th-century social science, to charac-
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 terize the nature and meaning of cultural differences. As
 the translators of other cultures to the West, we have
 become heirs to one of the projects of the broad sweep of
 Westem scholarship that Said (I978) calls "Oriental-
 ism." We are the Orientalists who give critical, refined
 (and, we used to hope, "scientific") substance to West-
 ern ideas of Otherness. In place of "the Eastern mind"
 has come, in anthropological discourse, not simply
 "Chinese culture" or "Indian culture" but a much more
 finely differentiated mosaic of local cultural variation.
 The anthropological conception of "culture" has always
 lent itself to essentialist depictions of other people's
 worlds as radically different from our own. Represen-
 tations of Otherness that have been highly influential
 far beyond anthropology, such as Dorothy Lee's depic-
 tion of the Trobriand language, Kiriwinan, as encoding
 conceptions of time, space, and causality so deeply and
 fundamentally different from ours as to be almost in-
 comprehensible (Lee I949), have been a crucial part of
 our Orientalist project throughout this century. We have
 populated the tribal world with mystical philosophers
 and brooding paranoids, situated them in experiential
 worlds so different from ours that anthropology has had
 to be a translation of the radically alien. The currently
 fashionable emphasis on the cultural constructedness of
 emotions (Lutz and White I986) and concepts of person
 and agency has generated further relativisms, further
 worlds of the exotic.
 How different other people's experienced and cognized
 worlds are from our own remains an open question. My
 concern, as skeptic, is that our strategies of fieldwork
 (which lead us to learn local languages to limited de-
 grees), our theoretical predispositions to focus on the
 most exotic cultural texts we can find and to read them
 in the most exotic ways we can construe, the career
 inducements for us to select in precisely these ways, and
 an inadequate understanding of the pervasively meta-
 phoric structuring of language all conspire to produce,
 and reinforce, a view of other people's worlds as more
 radically different from one another and our own than
 they are. Our project of cultural translation, even in
 these relativistic days, can produce mistranslations.
 Comments
 RICHARD D. DAVIS
 P.O. Box 4399, Agana, Guam 969IO, U.S.A. 2I III 89
 Keesing's argument is framed by intriguing assertions
 and observations, but he does not develop a discussion of
 these. The most far-reaching parts of this presentation
 are the least elaborated. I doubt that he will provoke
 much serious disagreement with the basic proposition
 that mistakes have been made and will continue to be
 made in the renderings of "experienced and cognized
 worlds" among various cultural traditions. But he has
 asserted that "postmodernist relativisms" are contribut-
 ing to a general decline in standards for such renderings
 and encouraging an "anything-goes" atmosphere for
 these endeavors. While the main body of the paper gives
 accounts of mistaken renderings that can now be im-
 proved, none of the examples are clearly attributed to
 the malign influences of "postmodernist relativisms."
 Systematic biases and lack of due caution or adequate
 preparation are given more direct blame.
 Keesing faults the discipline of anthropology as a
 whole for fostering systematic biases in the manner in
 which such renderings are selected and presented.
 Whether and to what degree the discipline has fostered
 exaggeration of the exotic qualities of these experienced
 and cognized worlds are more debatable than the propo-
 sition that demonstrable mistakes have frequently been
 made in describing them. Keesing himself notes that
 most of his evidence for this point is anecdotal, but I
 share his belief on this matter. Other writers (e.g., Fabian
 i983) have also noted how anthropology has consis-
 tently applied rhetorical devices that distance the ob-
 server from the object and otherwise overemphasize
 differences.
 Since Keesing specifically denigrates "postmodernist
 relativisms" as detrimental to current inquiries, one
 should note that not everything going by a label of "rel-
 ativism" should receive the same critique. In his call for
 stricter attention to "surface evidence," for greater
 awareness of the biases of received instruction, for at-
 tempts to master the languages involved more fully,
 Keesing is close in spirit to the reasons advanced
 by Herskovits (I973:38) for "methodological relativ-
 ism"-the better to get at facts unvarnished by several
 systematic biases. While Keesing may find other faults
 with other relativisms, there are some that do not share
 the faults of the postmodernist variety.
 As Keesing notes, the important matter is the open
 question that needs to be systematically investigated:
 To what extent do experienced and cognized worlds dif-
 fer, and in what respects? Just how exotic can two or
 more of these worlds be to each other? The sorts of trans-
 lations and renderings that ethnographers and an-
 thropological linguists have been compiling (mistakes
 and all) do little except demonstrate that there are differ-
 ences and similarities. Assessing the kinds and degrees
 of differences or similarities relative to each other is an-
 other matter. Keesing does not give much indication of
 how, in his opinion, this open question should be ad-
 dressed. It is an important question and an enduring and
 elusive one, one that has challenged the best an-
 thropological theory in each generation. To what extent
 can human cultures support the development of cogni-
 tive organizations that are inaccessible to each other?
 Are there truly different kinds of minding at work in
 different cultures, or are there similar kinds of cognitive
 functions with different content? Considering the high
 level of skill and scholarship that Keesing brings to bear
 on his topics, a description of how he would propose that
 anthropologists make a concerted effort at answering
 this question would be worth much.
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 ARIE DE RUIJTER
 Department of Anthropology, University of Utrecht,
 Utrecht, The Netherlands. 3 IV 89
 Keesing has written an interesting article. I agree with
 his main arguments and just want to elaborate two
 points:
 i. Although it may be true that interpretation is al-
 ways perspectival, that realities are always multiple and
 constructed, and that along with the vanishing goal of a
 "true" interpretation the possibility of a misinterpreta-
 tion is also fading away, this does not mean that this
 post-modern tendency is warranted. We do not have to
 submit ourselves to an absolutist relativism. Of course
 knowledge cannot simply be viewed as mirroring the
 way reality is. We have to admit that it is "the outcome
 of long term interactions with the world that have been
 shaped into stylized fabrications" (De Vries I987:2I9).
 This does not, however, imply complete freedom in con-
 ceptualizing the world. Reality may not speak for itself,
 but it kicks back if wrongly addressed or conceived. In
 this context a relevant distinction can be made between
 epistemic relativism, asserting that knowledge is index-
 ical, contextual, and conventional, i.e., is socially and
 historically situated, and judgmental relativism, assert-
 ing that all beliefs are equally valid in the sense that
 there can be no rational grounds for preferring one over
 another (Bhaskar I979a:734; I979b:35 I). "Stressing the
 situatedness and the contextualised indexical nature of
 knowledge only implies that knowledge is assessed not
 by appeal to ultimate foundations but through criteria
 that are internal to and dependent on the community
 that wants them to be assessed" (Raven I988:III). Al-
 though these criteria are, in the end, a form of rational
 persuasion that can never attain definite ahistorical clo-
 sure, meaning that a definite answer may not be possible
 and disagreement may always remain, this is something
 other than the "anything-goes" formula of judgmental
 relativism. We only have to accept the idea of a socially
 restricted or relative relativism.
 2. Keesing states that he is "deeply skeptical of inter-
 pretations for which the main evidence lies in the stuff
 of language." He does not, however, come up with an
 alternative research strategy. I want to stress the fruit-
 fulness of praxis-or action-theories. From the seman-
 tic-praxeological perspective, linguistic utterances are
 interpreted as parts of more encompassing actions. This
 means that extra-linguistic criteria can be used to assess
 the validity and reliability of the anthropologist's in-
 terpretations. This perspective also offers more pos-
 sibilities for acknowledging the heterogeneous, contin-
 gent aspects of culture than a purely linguistic approach,
 with its emphasis on the systematic and shared compo-
 nents of culture. I want especially to point to Geertz's
 theory of practice, because he emphasizes the public and
 intersubjective character of culture. In his view, culture
 consists of interrelated symbols (conceptions as well as
 their vehicles of expression) that are tightly linked to the
 concrete public activities of everyday life. This shift to
 describing and analyzing persisting and recurrent public
 events and activities may result in inhibiting the quest
 for the exotic in anthropology. It may show that other
 people are motivated by similar existential needs or cir-
 cumstances. It may accentuate the paradox of the in-
 terpretive anthropological enterprise: the exploration of
 the exotic, with its emphasis on cultural differences and
 otherness, is based on the thesis of the psychic unity of
 mankind.
 J. W. FERNANDEZ
 Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago,
 Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A. I3 iv 89
 Keesing describes this article as devil's advocacy, but the
 deviltry here seems like the balancing act so often found
 in anthropology (as in most human science) between the
 transcendent (in this case cognitive) explanation of hu-
 man universals and the grounded interpretation of
 human particularities-differences that arise in the
 creation of culture and the revitalization of human
 solidarity in community. His critique of possible misun-
 derstanding and overinterpretation of grammar and lexi-
 con is salutary-indeed, it points us at just good ethno-
 graphic fieldwork.
 I am not sure of the logic, in this relativistic age, of the
 argument that "though we can no longer be right we can
 still be wrong." This may mean that though we can
 never be right in our interpretations we can be wrong in
 our explanations. But this would seem to bring the old
 "truth-value" logic in through the back door. Most re-
 cent argument would maintain on this score-and in
 keeping with the shift from Aristotelian categories to
 family-relation-type categories with prototypical organi-
 zation-that rightness or wrongness should be replaced
 with nearness or farness, relevance or irrelevance, being
 more or less in touch with local meanings-which is to
 say local images and local prototypes. Less relevant ac-
 counts of human thought and action are those that ex-
 press the preoccupations and serve primarily the images
 and interests of the social group to which the account-
 giver belongs. More relevant accounts are as integrated
 as possible within the vectors of local awareness. In any
 event, Keesing is mainly interested in explaining cogni-
 tive processes of category construction and the limits
 that this knowledge places on free-wheeling interpreta-
 tion of local awareness.
 Although I do not doubt the frequency of misunder-
 standing-particularly in the area of cosmology or local
 philosophy-produced by superficial control of local
 language and the compulsion to find difference, I would
 like to balance the argument a bit differently. Keesing's
 focus on the dead metaphor trapped in convention and
 idiomaticity overlooks the "invention" or "creation" of
 culture or tradition (see Wagner I976, Hobsbawm and
 Ranger I983). It misses the "social use" to which
 metaphor can be put, in difficult human circumstances,
 in problem solving and in building world views (Sapir
 and Crocker I977). I would play "angels' advocate" for
 such a "pragmatics of metaphor"-for an enduring an-
 thropological interest in human playfulness and human
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 capacity to create or enliven metaphors and to build uni-
 verses on such grains of sand. I would argue that study of
 the conventional structures of dead metaphors should be
 enlivened by the field study of the lively "play of tropes"
 (Fernandez i986). Indeed, in the "division of labor" in
 the human sciences of which Keesing speaks the study
 of such invention or creative play falls to anthropology
 as a primary task.
 Keesing argues that we should not read lively meaning
 into dead metaphors, and of course we should not. On
 the other hand, we should not ignore the lively, once
 and future, figurality of these forms. A conventional
 metaphor, one whose figurality has been forgotten or is
 ignored, is subject to revitalization, and the often playful
 revitalization processes are, or should be, of particular
 interest to anthropology.
 Keesing gives the instance, cited by Lakoff and John-
 son (I980:I43), of a foreigner's reading a chemical
 metaphor into the idiomatic English "I have a solution
 to my problems." Any reader can, however, recognize
 the poetry and the potential illumination in such "mis-
 takenness." Indeed, such "foreign" readings occur every
 day, for our idiomatic expressions and the metaphors in
 our grammar can be ceaselessly brought back to life in
 many "foreign" ways. And in that sense language is a
 reservoir of potential for revitalized understanding. Re-
 vitalization movements themselves are full of such new
 readings of the conventional and the idiomatic (Fernan-
 dez i982). In these movements, people who have been
 made "foreign" to themselves and their circumstances
 often find a "path" out of their alienation by creative
 metaphor. And such paths can even lead to complicated
 world views. Though we may misread active meaning in
 the merely conventional, lively metaphor once lay in it
 and is always potential in it.
 Nor should one suppose that revitalization processes
 are strange and unusual. Of great variety, small and
 large, they happen all the time, in language as in reli-
 gion, as an enlivening reaction to the overbearing "con-
 ventionalization" or routinization of life. Vico long ago
 argued (Vico I976), as have many others since, that there
 is a cyclicity built into human affairs that involves a
 devitalization of meaningful metaphor and its subse-
 quent necessary revitalization. In any event a sense of
 proportion and of the "division of labor" that Keesing
 addresses would seem to require that we complement
 the cognitive enterprise and its search for bare semantic
 structures with the anthropological enterprise and its
 attention to those recurrent cultural moments and cul-
 tural movements in which something new and lively
 and colorful is created out of-to use the linguist's
 metaphor he evokes-the "bleached bones" of the past.
 JOSHUA A. FISHMAN
 Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology, Albert
 Einstein College of Medicine Campus, Yeshiva
 University, Bronx, N.Y. 10461, U.S.A. I 4 iv 89
 Keesing begins his insightful critique of anthropological
 methods with a reference to "postmodernist relativisms
 in anthropology" and to the "vanishing goal of a 'true'
 interpretation." He then proceeds directly to the particu-
 lar problems of "exotic readings" to which he seeks to
 sensitize the reader. It seems to me, however, that by
 remaining entirely within the (still dominant) tradition
 of ethnographic anthropology, he inevitably fails to find
 a solution to the methodological shortcoming that he
 quite rightly points out.
 Frankly, it is somewhat of a relief for me, as a method-
 ologically oriented interdisciplinary social scientist, to
 note the recent fall from absolute grace of ethnography
 and from absolute certainty of ethnographic anthropol-
 ogy. Notwithstanding all of the cautions long expressed
 by researchers and methodologists in the various social
 sciences (as distinct from those only more recently ex-
 pressed by anthropologists as an unusually large number
 of doubts began to accumulate) pertaining to the many
 problems and uncertainties of ethnographic research,
 the general mood in connection with ethnography has
 been triumphalist, as if the methodological millennium
 had arrived. Such problems as were acknowledged were
 essentially intraethnographic ones-problems that true
 believers could hammer out with one another-rather
 than issues calling for more basic methodological com-
 parison, criticism, or combination. Keesing's willing-
 ness to disclose several additional problematic wrinkles
 in ethnographic research is, unfortunately, really only
 more of the same "within-the-guild" self-criticism. Al-
 though obviously quite right as far as it goes, it is too
 little and too late to cope with the problem at hand. This
 also becomes clear from the fact that he limits himself
 to diagnosis without offering very much of a prescrip-
 tion.
 Many of the criticisms of anthropology voiced by
 Keesing have been expressed before, some of them for
 well over a quarter-century, as can be noted from the
 extensive early (and subsequently recurring) criticisms
 of the linguistic-relativity work of Benjamin Lee Whorf
 (summarized in Fishman I980, i982). Within the con-
 text of triumphalist behaviorism, experimentalism,
 quantificationism, and formal measurement that was
 sweeping American psychology (and, in part, sociology
 too) at that time, such criticism seemed partisan and
 reductionistic in intent and in provenience. Anthropol-
 ogy as a whole was little influenced by it and ultimately,
 a generation later, rejected that criticism with an equally
 triumphant reinvestiture of ethnography. Lost in the
 shuffle was the fact that attempts to test Whorfian lin-
 guistic relativity via the formulation of hypotheses that
 could be examined by other methods than Whorf's (Car-
 roll and Casagrande I958) discredited it as far as the
 cognitive sciences were concerned.
 The basic methodological danger in Whorf's work, and
 to which, as is beginning to be recognized (see, in addi-
 tion to Keesing, e.g., Geertz I988), ethnography con-
 stantly exposes itself, is that of a monism in which the
 measurer and the measure are one and the same. Given,
 as Keesing admits, that "interpretation is always per-
 spectival," there is constant risk that anthropologists are
 telling us more about themselves in their ethnographies
 than they realize. It is exactly in this connection that
This content downloaded from 129.79.34.224 on Tue, 03 May 2016 17:10:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 472 1 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 30, Number 4, August-October I989
 Geertz (i988:i29) asks rhetorically, "Whose life is it
 anyway?"
 What, then, is the solution to the anthropologists' di-
 lemma? The baby and the bathwater have once before
 been thrown out together. It would be a major disaster
 for anthropology and for all of social science were that to
 happen again merely because ethnography is not the
 "know-all" and the methodological "cure-all" that its
 high priests originally represented it to be. Neither
 greater mastery of the local languages nor deeper famil-
 iarity with the cutting edge of linguistic theory will fully
 counteract the "exotic error." That error can, however,
 be minimized by adopting study designs that make a
 more conscious and conscientious distinction between
 the measure and the measurer and by deriving from an-
 thropological ethnographies the kinds of hypotheses
 that these other designs might either confirm, reject, or
 refine. This was the lesson of Carroll and Casagrande's
 Southwest Project, and it is a lesson that more and more
 anthropologists are learning and teaching today (see Kirk
 and Miller I986, Gephart I988). While cutting ethnog-
 raphy down to size, it will help maintain the credibility
 of anthropology as a whole.
 REMO GUIDIERI
 Departement d'Anthropologie, Universite de Paris X,
 Nanterre, France. I7 iv 89
 All Keesing's irritation is focused on my alleged in-
 sufficient mastery of a language that he admittedly does
 not know himself. I have, according to him, confused
 mamana, a verbal form, with mamana-a, a nominalized
 form. My translation of mamana-a as l'authentique
 does, however, supply a nominalized form for a nomi-
 nalized form. But what annoys him obviously lies else-
 where-in the alleged interpretive invention leading to
 my "mystical" characterization of Fataleka thought.
 The main point of his argument has to do with my use of
 two terms: authentique and apparition. His criticism of
 the use of authentique rests on a single argument: that
 realisation or verite would have been better. He seems
 unaware that the term authentique (cf. its original
 meaning in Greek) contains the senses of realisation and
 verite: it is simply broader and more fundamental than
 either. His representation of the term mamana-a as "a
 kind of euphemism for the ancestor(s)" is a little like
 substituting "God" for every occurrence of "the Eter-
 nal" in a biblical text on the pretext that the latter is
 only a kind of euphemism for the former with no partic-
 ular significance. As for his criticism of my use of appa-
 rition, it borders on the ridiculous. The dictionary does
 indeed include, among the various meanings of the word
 apparition, that of "phantom," but it is obviously not in
 that marginal sense that I use the term. In philosophy,
 apparition and manifestation are synonyms, and there-
 fore replacing apparaltre with devenir manifeste would
 be replacing like with like.
 My knowledge of Fataleka would certainly have al-
 lowed errors of detail such as those to which Keesing
 points with regard to the confusion between fwana
 and fwana-ere. Notions as crucial as mamana-a and
 sakatafa, however, have, I believe, received the atten-
 tion they require, and the translations I propose are
 based on thorough knowledge both of French and of the
 tradition of thought attached to certain terms in that
 language.
 At the heart of this debate, clearly, is whether it is
 proper to reduce all the types of discourse of a culture to
 a single one: the discourse of everyday life. Our lan-
 guages and cultures have specialized discourses: the
 term "charity" does not mean the same to the clergy as
 it does to the press, although the two meanings are re-
 lated. Denying other cultures this diversity of levels of
 discourse-considering them good only for the im-
 mediate requirements of everyday life-is either racism
 or ignorance. These are the two reefs on which most
 ethnologists, of whatever school, run aground. What is
 shocking is, at bottom, that these people are capable, on
 the basis of commonsense notions, of producing genuine
 conceptual elaborations. But this is understandable; con-
 ceptual elaboration is always shocking to those who are
 incapable of it.
 GEORGE LAKOFF
 Department of Linguistics, University of California at
 Berkeley, Berkeley, Calif. 94720, U.S.A. io iii 89
 Burned lips on broth/Now blows on cold water.
 W.S. MERWIN, Asian Figures
 Keesing has been burned. He has caught himself making
 a false inference from grammar to cosmology, the sort of
 inference he has seen other anthropologists make, and
 now he wisely advises caution. He senses "a new
 urgency" and "exciting vistas for anthropology" in the
 recent insights that have come from cognitive linguis-
 tics, but, as he points out, he is more concerned about
 the dangers than about the possibilities. In recent years,
 anthropologists have wisely taken stock of the difficul-
 ties of interpretation and the ways analysts can impose
 interpretations on texts. It is time to put what has been
 learned to use and get back to the exciting-and de-
 manding-work of studying the conceptual systems of
 people around the world.
 The new developments allow for both a wide range of
 new insights and a check on mistakes of the sort Keesing
 cites. He may remain "deeply skeptical of interpreta-
 tions for which the main evidence lies in the stuff of
 language," but his worst fears can be quelled. Such inter-
 pretations are also mistaken from the point of view of
 cognitive linguistics, and there are criteria that allow us,
 in a wide range of cases, to say why.
 As Keesing suggests, the false understanding by my
 Iranian student of "the solution of my problems" came
 before he studied linguistics. The student told it to me,
 laughing at his former naivete. He had just learned how
 to look for systematic evidence of metaphorical struc-
This content downloaded from 129.79.34.224 on Tue, 03 May 2016 17:10:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 KEESING Exotic Readings of Cultural Texts | 473
 ture, and this was an example of a mistake he would
 have avoided had he known earlier what he had just
 learned. Keesing draws the moral: beware of linguistic
 evidence. I draw the opposite moral: with solid training
 in cognitive linguistics, you can make sense of the lin-
 guistic evidence and avoid such mistakes.
 Linguistic evidence, when used with care, can be a
 guide to conceptual structure. But conceptual structure
 does not equal cosmology. When anthropologists de-
 scribe the cosmology of a culture, what they usually
 have in mind is a folk model of (i) the universe that is (2)
 all-embracing, (3) consistent, (4) conscious, (5) believed,
 and (6) acted on. In general, the kinds of conceptual
 structure that we have found do not have all these char-
 acteristics. Individual conceptual metaphors map out
 separate conceptual domains that are very much smaller
 than the universe and limited in scope, domains like
 time, anger, love, thought, communication, morality,
 the self, and so on. Though internally consistent, they
 are often inconsistent with one another (see Lakoff and
 Johnson I980: chaps. i6 and I7; Gentner and Gentner
 i982). Though occasional conceptual metaphors are con-
 scious, most, like rules of phonology and syntax, are not.
 Some are believed by at least some people, some are
 disbelieved, and most, though used unconsciously for
 the purposes of automatic conceptualization, are never
 even considered as possible objects of belief. A given
 metaphor may even be consciously disbelieved but
 nonetheless used for understanding and acted on. For
 example, no one believes that a country is a person, yet
 there is a popular theory of intemational relations in
 which a nation-state is viewed as a rational actor, and
 foreign-policy decisions are commonly made on the ba-
 sis of this metaphor.
 As for Keesing's example of the English concept of
 luck, no thorough, systematic metaphorical analysis
 that I know of has yet been done. From a cursory look at
 some of the relevant data, I would make the following
 unsubstantiated guess: we do have a metaphorical con-
 cept of luck in our conceptual system; it does not play
 much of a role in our overall conceptual system (e.g.,
 does not enter into many other metaphorical concepts);
 some speakers seriously believe in luck but most do not;
 all speakers, whether they believe in luck or not, are
 capable of understanding common situations in terms of
 luck; and more people act on the concept of luck than
 actually believe in it. If I am right, then the language of
 luck reveals something significant about our conceptual
 systems but not an overall cosmology.
 The exact conceptual status of a metaphor is an empir-
 ical matter that must be established one case at a time.
 Cosmologies make use of conceptual metaphors, but
 conceptual metaphors need not tell one anything about
 cosmology. What I take Keesing to be suggesting is a
 shift from the study of cosmology to the study of concep-
 tual systems. From the little we know so far, many con-
 ceptual metaphors are widespread. It is just as inter-
 esting to find out what aspects of conceptual systems are
 widespread (or even universal) as it is to find out what
 aspects are limited to geographical regions or even
 unique to a particular culture. And linguistic evidence
 can tell us a great deal about the nature of conceptual
 systems.
 A careful cognitive linguist looks for convincing evi-
 dence. In the case of conceptual metaphor, there are five
 kinds of evidence that are considered:
 i. Systematic polysemy-a systematic correspon-
 dence between source-domain senses of words and corre-
 sponding target-domain senses (see Lakoff and Brugman
 I986). This requires working out the details of a source-
 domain structure and a structure-preserving partial map-
 ping to a corresponding target-domain structure.
 2. Inferential structure-a systematic correspondence
 between source-domain inferences and corresponding
 target-domain inferences (see Lakoff I987:case study i).
 3. Experimental evidence (see, e.g., Gibbs and O'Brien
 I989, Gentner and Gentner i982).
 4. Historical evidence (see, e.g., Sweetser's [n.d.] study
 of a range of cases in which a conceptual metaphor must
 be present before a semantic change in the lexicon can
 take place).
 5. Poetic evidence-systematic extensions of live con-
 ceptual metaphors in poetry (see Turner I987, Lakoff
 and Turner I989).
 Though it is difficult to find all five types of evidence,
 three or more types often converge. Typically one looks
 at the very least for polysemic and inferential evidence.
 And where there is more than one possible analysis (as
 there often is), one has to look for further evidence in the
 overall structure of the conceptual system.
 Our evidential criteria are, like those of any science,
 by no means perfect, and they are still being developed.
 When evidential conflicts arise, it is a signal that some-
 thing is wrong, and we try to find out what it is. But the
 process is highly constrained and protected to a consid-
 erable extent from the whims of the analyst.
 Keesing's cautions against being an "unwary exotica-
 seeker" are real enough, but I am positive where he is
 negative. If I were Keesing, I would not wring my hands
 about the real difficulties of interesting research. I
 would, instead, do everything I could to make sure my
 students got some serious training in cognitive linguis-
 tics, training that would both turn them on to the pos-
 sibilities of profound research into comparative concep-
 tual systems and teach them what kinds of evidence
 they would need to establish their claims. The antidote
 to irresponsible research is responsible research, not no
 research at all.
 NORM MUNDHENK
 Box 723, Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea. 28 III 89
 The concern and caution that are the main point of this
 article seem to me quite correct and well worth taking to
 heart, but I suspect that the article is open to serious
 misunderstanding, misquotation, and misuse. Keesing is
 warning us against a faddish focus on what is strange in
 another culture-against a skewing of the evidence to
 overemphasize the Other. He is not denying that there
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 may be much that is difficult or strange in one culture
 when viewed from the viewpoint of another.
 His concentration on language as a potential red her-
 ring for an anthropologist attempting to get inside the
 thought patterns of a culture is unquestionably valid,
 though it will doubtless be hard for many to accept his
 estimate of a need for five to ten years' immersion in a
 language to gain adequate fluency in it.
 Much is made of interesting recent work in linguistics
 by such scholars as Lakoff, Johnson, and Heine, but here,
 too, caution may well be in order. Language's sticky
 traps have caught not only anthropologists but also
 many linguists. I believe that Keesing's point will stand
 even when some of the theoretical details put forward by
 these scholars have been questioned, altered, or dis-
 proved through further study.
 In connection with this, there is one point at which
 his own choice of terminology is a potential source of
 confusion. His use of the term "metaphor" is not meant
 to imply that the linguistic items referred to are real
 figures of speech for the speakers of a language, and I feel
 that it would be helpful to limit the use of the term to
 this meaning. Once the figure of speech has been forgot-
 ten and become a frozen relic, it is better to use a differ-
 ent term, perhaps "idiom." The surprising thing is that
 for many speakers even expressions that seem so clear
 that one would think they were living metaphors may
 still be used as idiomatic units with no metaphorical
 sense. It is possible to speak of "being at the end of one's
 tether" without once thinking of a metaphorical cow at
 the end of a rope; but this is only to reinforce what
 Keesing is saying.
 PAUL NEWMAN
 Department of Linguistics, Indiana University,
 Bloomington, Ind. 47405, U.S.A. i3 IV 89
 The gist of Keesing's article can be summarized in one
 sentence: In analyzing cultural texts, anthropologists
 sometimes make mistakes. This point is so obvious-or
 should be so obvious-that one's first reaction is amaze-
 ment that a serious academic journal should bother to
 publish such a piece. When one looks at the specific
 sources of error discussed, however, it turns out that
 Keesing has raised issues that are timely and important,
 albeit not original, and thus deserve serious attention
 and discussion.
 One of the factors that accounts for error is the "quest
 for the exotic," i.e., the tendency to choose symbolically
 rich interpretations of non-Western events and texts
 whenever possible. The potential for such bias has been
 well known for years (see Naroll i962). More recently
 Geertz (i984:275) has spoken (approvingly?) of an-
 thropologists as "merchants of astonishment." Spiro
 (i986:276), who approaches anthropological description
 and interpretation from a totally different perspective,
 parodies the anthropologist "whose appetite is nour-
 ished by strange customs of exotic peoples." Keesing un-
 convincingly ascribes much of the appeal of the exotic to
 careerism. A simpler explanation is that what attracts
 people to anthropology in the first place is its reputation
 as an unconventional academic field offering challenge
 and adventure. As Geertz, crediting Kroeber, puts it,
 there is in anthropology a "centrifugal impulse . . . dis-
 tant places, distant times, distant species . . . distant
 grammars" (I984:265).
 Although general ethnographers by now should have
 become alert to the exotic bias, text-oriented an-
 thropologists, linguists, and folklorists seem not to be,
 especially when they encounter figurative or metaphor-
 ical language. When a symbolic anthropologist learns,
 for example, that in Hausa "popularity" is farin jinii
 ('white blood'), "bravery" is jiar zuuciyaa ('red heart'),
 and "unhappiness" is bak'in cikii ('black stomach'), the
 immediate assumption is that one is dealing with
 metaphor of cultural, cognitive significance. But is it
 true that figurative expressions such as these have a
 symbolic meaning for native Hausa-speakers that is any
 different from their more mundane English equivalents?
 As Keesing warns, anthropologists should be extremely
 wary of reading cosmological significance into other
 peoples' metaphorical language; so-called metaphorical
 expressions are often conventional manners of speech
 and nothing more.
 Unfortunately, in reacting against what he sees as a
 naive infatuation with other peoples' exotic metaphors,
 Keesing goes too far and seems to rule out the possibility
 that a language's particular means of expression might
 be a symbolic key to matters of real cultural importance.
 That is, he in effect replaces the bias of exotic interpreta-
 tion by an equally biased presumption of irrelevance. It
 may be true that "conventional" metaphor in any lan-
 guage is without cognitive salience or cultural import,
 but that begs the question of what is "conventional."
 The problem is to determine which metaphors (or other
 forms of expressive language) are alive and which are
 dead, and if they are alive, to what extent, for whom, and
 in what contexts. The rejection of gratuitous exoticism
 does not entail the adoption of a methodological ap-
 proach that a priori turns its back on the essential an-
 thropological goal of documenting human cultural and
 linguistic diversity wherever it exists.
 The other source of error in textual interpretation that
 Keesing focuses on is inadequate knowledge of the na-
 tive language. Without quite attacking the matter head-
 on, Keesing raises doubts about one of anthropology's
 sacred myths: the idea that fieldwork is carried out in
 the native language. This question was discussed openly
 a half-century ago in a forgotten exchange between Mead
 (I939) and Lowie (I940), but nowadays I think it is fair to
 say that the myth generally goes unchallenged. It is per-
 petuated by generation upon generation of professors
 who casually present a fieldwork ideal to their students
 as if it represented an attainable reality and by a code of
 silence in the profession itself. In the introductions to
 their books, most ethnographers tell where they con-
 ducted their research, for how long, who funded it, and-
 especially nowadays-who were the principal infor-
 mants and/or assistants. Although the book will
 undoubtedly be strewn with native terms, there is un-
This content downloaded from 129.79.34.224 on Tue, 03 May 2016 17:10:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 KEESING Exotic Readings of Cultural Texts | 475
 likely to be any explicit mention of the investigator's
 level of proficiency in the language: the reader is sup-
 posed to come naturally to the "correct" (actually false)
 conclusion regarding the ethnographer's language profi-
 ciency. The fact of the matter is that most anthropolo-
 gists working in non-Western cultures have limited
 practical proficiency in the language of the people they
 are studying. There is no mystery why this is so and
 therefore no reason for it to be a deep dark secret: learn-
 ing a language in the field takes considerably more time
 than most anthropologists have available. (Amusingly,
 Burling [I984:94-96] effectively admits as much in the
 final three pages of his little book, the rest of which
 treats the field-language myth as if it were a realizable
 goal.)
 Whether one actually uses the field language for basic
 ethnographic research or not, it is essential to have a
 good command of the language if one intends to deal
 intelligently with text materials. One need not speak it
 fluently, but one has to understand it and understand
 how it works. The less one knows about the language,
 the greater the chance of making egregious errors (such
 as semantically conflating Hausa baiakii 'mouth' and
 bak'ii 'black' because both words appear orthographi-
 cally as baki). Keesing's own discussion of Polynesian
 mana, however, is not well chosen, since in his attempt
 to illustrate linguistic error he falls victim to exactly the
 kind of exotic bias he is warning against. He emphasizes
 that what is usually translated as a noun ("power") is
 really a verb, as if this were significant. But, unless one
 takes an extreme neo-Whorfian position, there is no rea-
 son to suppose that the grammatical part of speech in
 which a concept is lexically embodied has any cognitive
 or semantic importance. Anyone who has worked on a
 bilingual dictionary of English (or French or German)
 and some "exotic" language is aware of the frequency
 with which parts of speech fail to match one another. As
 in the case of metaphorical usage, what we don't know
 in advance is whether these part-of-speech differences
 truly reflect differences at some cognitive, semantic, or
 cultural level.
 In sum, Keesing's paper is valuable in drawing our at-
 tention to pervasive sources of error in anthropological
 interpretation. Whether the practical and philosophical
 constraints on anthropology in the I990S will allow any-
 thing to be done about it is a different matter.'
 R. DANIEL SHAW
 School of World Mission, Fuller Theological Seminary,
 Pasadena, Calif. 9II82, U.S.A. I4 iv 89
 Earlier this year Headland and Reid (I989) noted our
 need to study people in their context and honestly de-
 scribe their interaction with that context, pointing out
 that so-called primitive people do not exist in our world.
 Now Keesing enters the fray and argues that anthro-
 pologists should not be looking for the "most exotic pos-
 sible readings," lest they "in doing so . . . distort and
 mistranslate." To all this I add a hearty "amen."
 Anthropologists have often inappropriately focused on
 issues that set people apart. Instead, the focus should be
 on commonality, on the "mundane." In seeking to
 understand the varied particularity we tend to ignore the
 overarching issues that people everywhere, regardless of
 culture, must handle.
 Mistakes may occur even where analysis is linguis-
 tically correct. The response of the Samo (Western Prov-
 ince, Papua New Guinea) to our first orthography is a
 case in point (Shaw and Shaw I977). People regularly
 stumbled over certain words, and we discovered that
 all of these related to our phonemic decision to use
 portmanteau as the analytical solution to a knotty
 phonological problem. When reanalysis produced an
 equally valid alternative description and the orthog-
 raphy was accordingly changed, the stumbling disap-
 peared and people learned to read much more quickly.
 What we had considered the best (and therefore an emic)
 analysis was unrecognizable to the Samo; it did not
 match their cognition.
 Keesing warns against attributing too much cultural
 meaning to metaphoric usages and maintains that we
 must find interpretive evidence "outside the realm of
 linguistic forms." While taking this warning seriously
 for particular expressions, when forms have numerous
 manifestations in both language and culture an analyst
 can begin to suspect the existence of themes. The Samo
 use of location is an example. In a linguistic analysis of
 text material we discovered that locative forms occurred
 in 8I% of all sentences, indicating that the Samo can
 hardly speak without including locational information
 (Shaw and Shaw I973). Similarly, cultural manifesta-
 tions of this concept abound: in the designation of indi-
 viduals within the household or beyond, the recognition
 of groups within the boundaries of certain rivers and
 streams as allies and those on the other side as enemies,
 plant nomenclature dependent on location in forest,
 swamp, garden, or open area, and the relationship be-
 tween natural and supernatural powers. This interest in
 location affects the way the Samo relate to time and
 space, understand causality, appreciate relationships,
 and classify their world. Location is a deep-structure as-
 pect of their world view that affects nearly everything
 they do (Shaw I976). We cannot infer world view from
 one manifestation, but when a particular concept is rep-
 resented in many subsystems we can at least suspect its
 presence and begin to explore how people use it and
 what it means to them.
 The "cultural distance" of anthropologists entering a
 context very different from their own contributes to the
 possibility of misunderstanding (Shaw I987). Analysis of
 commonalities might produce a greater appreciation of
 mutual concerns and help us share our humanness. If
 cultural analysis is making "good guesses," where better
 to start than in those areas where our guesses are best
 made and can be explored to the benefit of all? Such an
 approach might help us avoid "exotic readings."
 I. This comment was prepared while I was a Fellow at the Center
 for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. The financial sup-
 port of NSF grant #BNS87-oo864 is gratefully acknowledged.
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 Reply
 ROGER M. KEESING
 Canberra, Australia. I2 V 89
 The critics seem to agree that we can and do sometimes
 misinterpret, overinterpret, and mistranslate. They give
 fairly widely divergent readings of what conclusions and
 lessons I was trying to draw from this (what better re-
 minder of the problematic nature of authorship, as ex-
 plored in recent critical theory, than such a range of
 interpretations of a text one remembers having written?)
 and propose relatively diverse solutions to the problem
 (whatever it is).
 I find the comments by Lakoff and Fernandez particu-
 larly illuminating in that each develops an argument
 with which I mainly agree, an argument implied but not
 extensively developed in my own paper. As Lakoff
 knows, I fully agree with him that exploring "conceptual
 structures" comparatively is a crucial and increasingly
 possible task to which anthropologists and cognitive lin-
 guists can both contribute. Until this has been done far
 more systematically, general pronouncements about the
 similarities and differences between cultures as systems
 of thought will be relatively vacuous. I agree with Lakoff
 that "linguistic evidence can tell us a great deal about
 the nature of conceptual systems," provided we use it
 wisely and carefully and do not overstate our interpreta-
 tions by great leaps into cosmology, theories of self and
 person, etc., and provided we do not select out the most
 exotic bits and pieces in the ways I have illustrated.
 "Our" concept of luck exactly illustrates the points I
 want to make, and I elsewhere (Keesing i985a:2o8-9)
 advance an interpretation essentially the same as
 Lakoff's. So, too, does Boyer (n.d.). The point is not that
 language is unrelated to thought and experience or that
 conventional metaphors have no cognitive salience but,
 rather, that this salience lies mainly on different levels
 than the one on which anthropologists have often placed
 their interpretations. As I comment elsewhere (i 985 a:
 209),
 We make implicit assumptions about the nature of
 the world perceived through sensory experience: the
 solidity of "solid" objects, the "downness" of down
 and "upness" of up, the commonsense perceptions
 of space, time, cause, etc. These assumptions are,
 I think, systematic and modelling, or paradigmatic.
 I have no doubt that they vary to some extent from
 culture to culture (as well as, to some extent, among
 individuals in a particular society); and I have no
 doubt that they are constituted in crucial ways by
 conventional metaphor, presented in the syntactic,
 semantic, and idiomatic channels of language.
 I go on (p. 2i5) to observe that
 [mapping] the conventional metaphoric schemata
 expressed in non-Western languages. . . and the
 metaphors in English and other Western languages
 (and the way they shape experience and channel
 thought). . . [poses] a major challenge to anthropolo-
 gists in the next decade. In this search, there will be
 room for those who seek to demonstrate both that
 metaphors are constitutive of experi'ence and guide
 and constrain thought and that the conventional
 metaphoric schemata of different peoples vary,
 thereby illuminating our own metaphor-boundness.
 There will be room too, I think, for skepticism. We
 cannot escape talking and thinking about the world
 through webs of conventional metaphor. Some are
 deep and deeply constraining of our thought (even
 though they may imply no profound metaphysic);
 others ... are much less so.
 I feel that my own explorations of the nature of "reli-
 gious" categories of non-Western peoples have been par-
 tial and in some ways overly negative. Assessing my
 critiques of anthropological interpretations of mana,
 Boyer (n.d.) shares this view and observes that "the nega-
 tive part of Keesing's argument ... is certainly convinc-
 ing, and the case for the elimination of hypostatized
 'metaphysics' is overwhelming." He goes on usefully to
 explore, as an alternative to analysis in terms of conven-
 tional metaphors, what he calls the "pseudo-natural
 kind" hypothesis regarding the acquisition and cognitive
 organization of "mystical" categories linked to "magico-
 religious entities." Needless to say, I welcome such al-
 temative lines of investigation, which I see as com-
 plementary to my own.
 Far from "wringing my hands" and advocating doing
 "no research at all," I am at the moment packing my
 bags for yet another field trip into Kwaio country and a
 further journey into a non-Western conceptual system,
 inevitably following pathways of language. The scars
 from previous trips and slips lead me to proceed more
 cautiously and wisely but not to give up. Lakoff (I987)
 has written the best comparative guidebook I have read.
 I agree with Fernandez that the conceptual structures
 expressed and reflected in language allow of creative in-
 novation, reanimation, "a play of tropes," and that such
 creativity is inherent in (not a superficial embroidery on)
 language. I am concerned, though, that in celebrating the
 creativity and flexibility of language, we may be led to
 spurious exoticism in a different guise-to highlighting
 those discursive genres and contexts (oratory, gossip,
 poetry) in which such such creativity is most vividly
 manifest and submerging from view those genres and
 contexts in which talk is most routinized. Pawley (I985,
 I986,I 988; Pawley and Syder I983) has been exploring
 the remarkable extent to which everyday conversations,
 whether in English or Kalam, are formulaic, constructed
 out of "canned" sequences. The nature of everyday talk
 in everyday contexts is a matter for comparative investi-
 gation (see, e.g., Moerman I988), not philosophical pro-
 nouncements, and despite recent progress rather little is
 yet known about it.
 Although Davis reads my paper as a general attack on
 "postmodernist relativisms," I had not intended it as
 such. My use of "relativism" in two senses was perhaps
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 confusing. First, I noted an irony in relativist concep-
 tions of interpretation: if no reading of a text can be
 authoritative or privileged, can a reading of a text still be
 wrong? It can be, I argue, if you don't know how to
 "read" the language. The other "relativism" is an ideol-
 ogy of radical cultural difference. While some streams in
 modem social thought emphasize radical Alterity and
 hence may promote spuriously exotic readings of cul-
 tural texts, some (e.g., Said and, as Davis notes, Fabian)
 subject our representations of Alterity to penetrating
 political and epistemological critique.
 I agree with de Ruijter that "describing and analyzing
 persisting and recurrent public events and activities"
 can be a way of "inhibiting the quest for the exotic in
 anthropology," but it does not magically protect us from
 mistranslation. Our descriptions may be considerably
 thinner than they seem. In this connection, just before
 reading Mundhenk's comments about my extravagant
 estimate of "five or ten years' immersion in a language"
 to gain access to the nuances of meaning and metaphor, I
 had lunch with a graduate student who had spent some
 twelve years living in a Balinese village. Commenting
 that her command of Balinese (in an extremely complex
 system of vertical registers) still falls far short of native
 fluency, she described wryly the way her Balinese
 friends characterized the competence in Balinese of
 three generations of ethnographers of the island. I have
 argued elsewhere (i987) that our theories of language
 and the way it reflects thought/experience (as well as
 our imperfect command of fieldwork languages) may
 lead us to misconstrue everyday talk in everyday con-
 texts, as well as the more ostensibly exotic discourse of
 ritual, magic, or myth.
 Guidieri and I are, I think, talking past one another.
 On the specific issues of translation involved, the reader
 will be the judge. The issues of conceptual translation at
 stake here have very little to do with differences be-
 tween "everyday" language and the registers used in
 communicating with the spirits and characterizing their
 nature and influence on human life. That there are dif-
 ferent registers and also that individuals vary greatly in
 the extent to which they develop and understand philo-
 sophically laden discourses have been central themes of
 my book on Kwaio religion (i982) and recent papers on
 knowledge and interpretation (I987, n.d.f). (This does
 not necessarily mean that folk philosophers have deep
 mystical knowledge or developed theological beliefs on
 which their ritual use of language depends [see Boyer
 (n.d.) for an argument that "mystical" categories in
 tribal religious thought characteristically are not based
 on systematic conceptualizations or "folk models"].) In
 the book and the forthcoming paper on "The Uses of
 Knowledge," I explore in detail the gifts and powers of
 folk philosophers among the Kwaio (some 2o miles to
 the south of the Fataleka) and their role in the produc-
 tion and reproduction of knowledge.
 I am as unclear about Fishman's "prescription" as he
 is about mine. I attempt to use ethnographic texts not in
 a "triumphalist" celebration of the particular but to il-
 luminate the general. My argument is partly that the
 reverse must also be true: "the general," including theo-
 retical developments regarding language but also devel-
 opments in social/critical/interpretive theory, must be
 drawn on to illuminate the particularities uncovered by
 ethnography. All the more reason, then, to be relent-
 lessly self-critical and self-reflexive about our discursive
 modes and our projects of cultural translation. The con-
 tradictions, paradoxes, and epistemological and political
 problems posed by our representations of Otherness
 (and, through otherness, Ourselves) are formidable and
 go far beyond the issues of language and translation I
 have addressed here. I have considered some of these
 questions in other recent writings (Keesing I989, n.d.
 b-e).
 I find it difficult to (re)read my text as an attempt, in
 Newman's words, "to rule out the possibility that a lan-
 guage's particular means of expression might be a sym-
 bolic key to matters of real cultural importance." As
 Lakoff observes, we now have some relatively solid ways
 of pursuing such questions, guided by increasingly pow-
 erful theories of language and categorization. Can I re-
 ally be read as advocating a "methodological approach
 that a priori turns its back on the . . . anthropological
 goal of documenting human cultural and linguistic di-
 versity wherever it exists"?
 I certainly endorse Shaw's proposition that "an analyst
 can begin to suspect the existence of themes" when
 "forms have numerous manifestations in both language
 and culture." That a culture constitutes a universe of
 thought and meaning that is in some important respects
 unique I take as a truism, and a starting point. Language
 is an essential medium for its coding, expression, com-
 munication, and acquisition. Despite my negative tone,
 I agree with Lakoff that the bottom line must certainly
 be the positive challenge of exploring and mapping that
 diversity, the levels on which it lies, and the com-
 monalities that underlie it.
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 Our Readers Write
 One would have thought that as we prepare to enter
 the final decade of the 2oth century the major interna-
 tional journal of anthropology would have dispensed
 with the anachronism "sciences of man" and adopted
 the far more accurate and fitting "sciences of human-
 kind" or "sciences of the human species." We assure
 even beginning students that anthropology is the study
 of the whole species, not half of it. My Webster's
 Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (i986) provides this
 definition: "i: the science of human beings; esp: the
 study of human beings in relation to distribution, ori-
 gin, classification, and relationship of races, physical
 character, environmental and social relations, and cul-
 ture." It consistently uses the term "human being,"
 not "man," in defining such related words as "an-
 thropic," "anthropocentric," "anthropography," "an-
 thropoid," "anthropometry," "anthropomorphic," and
 so on. Why, then, should CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
 cling to a term that is so gendercentric, especially as
 our field increasingly is composed of women as well
 as men?
 DAVID LANDY
 Department of Anthropology, University of Massachu-
 setts, Boston, Mass. 02I25, U.S.A. 20 II 89
 Prizes
 m The International Social Science Council and the
 Conjunto Universitario Candido Mendes invite nomi-
 nations for the fifth Stein Rokkan Prize, to be awarded
 for a substantial original contribution to comparative
 social science research by a scholar under 40 years of
 age on December 3I, I990. Nominations may be un-
 published manuscripts of book length, printed books,
 or collected works published since December I987.
 Four copies of a manuscript typed double-spaced or of
 a printed work, together with a letter of application
 with evidence of the candidate's age attached, should
 be delivered to the International Social Science Coun-
 cil before March I5, I990, and the award will be made
 at the ISSC General Assembly meeting in the fall of
 that year. The prize amounts to U.S. $2,000 and may
 be divided should it be found difficult to adjudicate
 among equally valuable works.
 The fourth Stein Rokkan Prize was awarded to
 Charles Ragin of Northwestern University for his book
 The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative
 and Quantitative Strategies.
 For further information, write: The Secretary Gen-
 eral, International Social Science Council, UNESCO,
 i, rue Miollis, 750I5 Paris, France.
This content downloaded from 129.79.34.224 on Tue, 03 May 2016 17:10:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
